

JOINT USI-CACDA SEMINAR

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THE NEW US STRATEGY AND IMPACT OF IRAQ WAR ON ARMS CONTROL AND THE UNITED NATIONS

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First Session

Deterrence and Containment to
Pre-emption – Analysis of the New
US Strategy and Impact of the Iraq War

- Chairman
Lt Gen Satish Nambiar, PVSM, AVSM, Vrc (Retd)
Director, USI

Second Session

International Arms Control Regimes

- Chairman
Ambassador Li Daoyu
President, CACDA

Third Session

The Future of the United Nations

- Chairman
Shri CR Gharekhan, IFS (Retd)

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THE PARTICIPANTS

USI Participants

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Lieutenant General Pran K Pahwa, PVSM (Retd) is a former Director General of the Air Defence Artillery. He was awarded Air Mshl S Mukherjee fellowship for the year 2000-2001 by the USI for carrying out research on the subject of "Command and Control of Indian Nuclear Forces". The research report has been published as a book by Knowledge World. Presently he is an advisor to M/s Guide Publications. He is editor of *SP's Land Forces* magazine.

Vice Admiral PS Das, PVSM, UYSM, VSM (Retd) joined the Navy in January 1960. During his four decades of service, he has held several important staff and command appointments. He was Chief of Staff at HQ Eastern Naval Command during the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) operations in Sri Lanka. Later, he held the post of Fortress Commander, Andaman and Nicobar Islands, now upgraded

into India's first unified theatre command. He took over as Director General Defence Planning Staff before moving to Vishakhapatnam as Commander-in-Chief of the Eastern Naval Command. He retired in February 1998. He is a Member of the Council of the United Service Institution of India; of the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA) and of the Surya Foundation think tank on national security and defence. He has the distinction of being the only retired officer nominated as member of the National Task Force on Higher Management chaired by Mr Arun Singh.

Air Marshal Vir Narain, PVSM (Retd) was commissioned in the Flying Branch of the Indian Air Force as a navigator in January 1951. He served with the Canberra contingent of the United Nations Expeditionary Force in the Congo in 1962, and was India's Air Attaché in Moscow and Budapest in the early 1980s. He retired in December 1987 as Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief of Training Command. He is a Member of the USI Council and the Chairman of the Board of Management for the USI Centre for Research.

Brigadier VK Nair, VSM (Retd) is from the Armoured Corps. He has held a number of command, instructional and staff appointments including a tenure in the Directorate of Perspective Planning at Army Headquarters. He holds a Ph.D in Political Science. He is the author of the book titled *Nuclear India*. He writes frequently on nuclear issues in different journals.

Shri JN Dixit, IFS (Retd) served in the Indian Foreign Service from 1958 to 1994. During his service he served as India's Ambassador in Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and Pakistan. He took over as Foreign Secretary in 1991 and served in that assignment till his retirement in 1994. A prolific writer, he has authored a number of books. He was a member of the National Security Advisory Board from 1998 to 2000. He is a senior member of the USI.

Shri CR Gharekhan, IFS (Retd) has been the Permanent Representative of India to the United Nations, New York from 1986 to 1992. He has also been the Under Secretary General, UN from 1993 to 1999. At present he is one of the Council Members of the USI.

Shri Bharat Karnad is a Senior Fellow in National Security Studies, at the Centre for Policy Research, New Delhi. He was adviser, defence expenditure to the 10th Finance Commission from 1992 to 1994 and member of the First National Security Advisory Board from 1998 to 1999. He has authored *Nuclear Weapons and Indian Security : The Realist Foundation of Strategy*.

Dr C Raja Mohan is a Professor of South Asian Studies at the Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi. He is author of the book *Crossing the Rubicon (2003)*. He is a columnist for the *The Hindu* an English daily newspaper.

Guest Participants

Ambassador Li Daoyu graduated from the University of Shanghai in 1952 and joined the foreign service. He has held a number of high level diplomatic assignments. He was the Permanent Representative (Ambassador) of the People's Republic of China (PRC) to the United Nations from 1990 to 1993. He was the Chinese Ambassador to the USA from April 1993 to February 1998. From March 1998 to March 2003 he was member of National People's Congress (NPC), Standing Committee of NPC and Chairman of China-USA and China-German Inter-Parliamentary Exchange Group. He is closely associated with a number of associations and universities. Presently, he is the President of China Arms Control and Disarmament Association (CACDA).

Major General Luo Bin (Retd) joined the military in 1961. He was the Military Attaché in erstwhile East Germany and Austria. From 1985 to 1990 he was Director of Political Department

in the General Staff HQ. From 1990 to 2001 he was Deputy Director General and Director General, Foreign Affairs Office. He was promoted to a General Officer in 1992 and he retired in 2001. Presently he is Senior Advisor China Institute of International Strategic Studies, Vice President China-Russia Friendship Association and Vice President CACDA.

Mr Ye Ru'an graduated from Department of English, Beijing Foreign Language Institute in 1965 and worked as a translator and interpreter with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs till 1972. From 1973 to 1993 he was a researcher at the China Institute of International Studies (CIIS). During the period he was also a visiting scholar to Centre for International Security and Arms Control of Stanford University, California, USA and the International Institute for Strategic Studies, London, UK. He was Vice President CIIS from 1990 to 1993. From 1994 to 2000 he was Counsellor / Minister-Counsellor, Embassy of China in USA. Presently he is Vice President, CACDA.

Mr Zheng Ruixiang was educated in Shanghai Fudan University and Beijing Broadcasting Institute, majoring in International Relations, English and Tamil from 1958 to 1963. He joined the Foreign Service in 1963. Before he joined CIIS in 1979, he had worked in the Chinese embassies in India and Sri Lanka and the Department of Education and Training of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He served as the Chinese Consul General in Mumbai from 1995 to 1998. He was Vice President of CIIS from 1991 to 1995. He has published a number of papers and articles on international affairs, particularly on South Asian issues in newspapers and academic journals. His contribution to books include *Nationality Issues in South Asia* and *A Comparative Study on the Modes of China and India's Economic Development*. Presently, he is a Senior Research Fellow of South Asia programme of CIIS.

WELCOME ADDRESS

LIEUTENANT GENERAL SATISH NAMBIAR, PVSM, AVSM, VrC (RETD)
DIRECTOR, USI

INTRODUCTORY REMARKS

AMBASSADOR LI DAOYU
PRESIDENT, CHINA ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT ASSOCIATION (CACDA)

WELCOME ADDRESS

**LIEUTENANT GENERAL SATISH NAMBIAR, PVSM, AVSM, VrC (RETD)
DIRECTOR, USI**

On behalf of the members of United Service Institution of India, it is my great pleasure to welcome Ambassador Li Daoyu and our friends from the China Arms Control and Disarmament Association (CACDA), Beijing to the Institution. It is an honour and a privilege to have you with us at the USI in pursuance of an initiative which we commenced in 2002. It was an interaction which saw a group of us from the USI visit Beijing in September 2002 for a very useful exchange of views.

This visit and discussions that we propose to engage in take place at a very interesting and defining moment in international politics. At the bilateral level between India and China, as we carry out our deliberations, there is a high level Indian delegation at Beijing for substantive talks on various issues including the boundary question. This is an engagement initiated by our political leadership in the knowledge that the problems between our countries need to be addressed and resolved in a spirit of understanding, compromise and adjustment. It is a measure of the maturity that has come to characterise Sino-Indian dialogues and there has been little or no "grandstanding" or attempts at "points scoring" in the last few years. In fact there is a realisation, albeit rather belated, that we have so much to gain from each other in the economic arena for the betterment of our people. I have no doubt that this visit by you and the discussions that we would engage in would further contribute to this process.

At the sub-regional level we meet at a defining moment in the history of Indo-Pakistan relations. The leadership of both countries have taken some momentous steps towards reducing tensions in the sub-continent and in initiating a process that will

hopefully result in a meaningful dialogue and understanding on issues that bedeviled relations between the two countries. The significance of this development within the confines of this seminar rests on the role that the People's Republic of China (PRC) can play in the context of its close and enduring relationship with Pakistan and of course the developing relationship with India.

All the three Sessions of the Seminar will rightly focus on the varying aspects of the dilemmas that face the international community today. The USA has moved away from deterrence and containment to preemption as a strategic imperative. This was manifest in the operations conducted by the US led coalition in Iraq. These operations introduced elements in the conduct of international relations that merit debate and analysis. To that end, the first Session will discuss the new US Strategy and its implications. In the second Session we hope to look at the international arms control regimes in the context of the realities of today's world. Finally, in the third Session we shall assess whether the international system represented by the UN has been dealt a body blow or whether there is hope yet that it will not only survive, but possibly emerge stronger from the current crisis.

Besides welcoming our friends from the PRC and their colleagues in the mission in Delhi, I would like to thank our colleagues from the USI of India for their spontaneous support in this event by their enthusiastic participation. I am sure all of us would look forward to a vigorous and meaningful set of discussions over the next two days.

Before we commence the first Session, I request Ambassador Li Daoyu to make a few remarks.

INTRODUCTORY REMARKS

AMBASSADOR LI DAOYU

PRESIDENT, CHINA ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT ASSOCIATION

It is our great privilege and pleasure to be here with our Indian colleagues in the USI. This is a follow up visit or the exchange of views following the visit of General Nambiar with his team from the USI to China.

First of all, we want to express our deep appreciations for the generous hospitality extended to us by the USI. We are very excited to be here because you are, in a sense, a big brother, because you have more than 133 years of history and CACDA is only a little bit more than three years old. We could benefit a lot from this type of exchange from your insights and knowledge. I agree that this visit is taking place at a very good time. First of all, it is opportune now that our two countries have improved bilateral relations remarkably in the recent years through frequent high level exchange of visits. Last year being a special case when your Prime Minister visited China and joint declarations on relationship and comprehensive cooperation between our two countries have been issued. This constitutes a very important guide in our relations. The overall cooperation in all fields has developed very steadily in a remarkable manner.

The exchange of scholars is also an important aspect of this kind of cooperation. We believe that exchange of views between the two academic institutions will make substantial contribution to the overall cooperation.

As has been said in the joint declaration, the two major developing countries, China and India have broad mutual interests in the maintenance of peace, stability and prosperity in Asia and the world. We need to develop a wider and closer cooperation and

understanding in regional and international affairs.

The year 2003 saw important events and developments in the international situation with far reaching impact. The discussion between us would focus on some very important and pressing issues. The first is the American Security Strategy with its impact on Iraq and arms control and the future of the United Nations (UN). We all know that General Nambiar has been appointed by the Secretary General Kofi Annan as a member of the High-Level Panel to study global security threats and recommend reforms of the international system. In this group we also have Mr Qian Qichen, my former boss. So we would like to hear from General Nambiar his insights of what would be the most important task for the UN in the future. Also I would expect very close cooperation between General Nambiar and Mr Qian Qichen because on many issues, China and India have similar stakes and see eye to eye. The joint declaration of the two countries have said that, "the common interests of the two sides outweigh differences." I also want to quote from the joint declaration that, "the difference should not be allowed to affect the overall development of bilateral relations." I think those guidelines not only apply to the relations between the two governments, but are also applicable to the cooperation and exchanges between the academic institutions of the two countries.

I would like to thank once again for the hospitality extended to us by the USI, Indian friends and General Nambiar. I look forward to a very fruitful discussion from which my Chinese colleagues would also benefit a lot.

DETERRENCE AND CONTAINMENT TO PRE-EMPTION – ANALYSIS OF THE NEW US STRATEGY AND IMPACT OF THE IRAQ WAR

FIRST SESSION

- Chairman* : Lieutenant General Satish Nambiar, PVSM, AVSM, VrC (Retd)
- First Paper* : Shri JN Dixit, IFS (Retd)
- Second Paper* : Mr Ye Ru'an
- Third Paper* : Vice Admiral PS Das, PVSM, UYSM, VSM (Retd)
- Discussants* : Shri Bharat Karnad
Mr Zheng Ruixiang

FIRST SESSION : FIRST PAPER**SHRI JN DIXIT, IFS (RETD)**

The concepts and practice of deterrence, containment and pre-emption have become more frequent in the security and strategic discourse of contemporary international politics. These three concepts are not original. They have always been ingredients of the defence policies of nation-states. The only difference now is that the concepts have been articulated specifically, not only as the content of defence policies of nation-states, but as legitimate instrumentalities of international action to safeguard democracy, to uphold human rights, to eliminate weapons of mass destruction and to ensure good governance.

Out of the three concepts, the two, namely, deterrence and containment constituted the terms of reference of the foreign and defence policies of major powers confronting each other during the Cold War period from 1945 to 1991. The third concept, pre-emption was an operational phenomenon used by nation-states as and when necessary compared to the phenomenon of deterrence and containment, which constituted the substance of the strategic policies of nation states, particularly, the former Soviet Union and the United States of America. The ingredients of deterrence and containment manifested themselves in the military alliances, which the USA and the former Soviet Union created during the Cold War. Deterrence found particular expression in the competitive accumulation of conventional and more importantly, nuclear weapons, and missile systems by them.

With the end of the Cold War, the rationale of the concepts of deterrence, containment and pre-emption, have

undergone change. The old ideological basis underpinning these policies changed from the confrontation between democracies and communism, to a new moral frame-work, justifying deterrence, containment and pre-emption. The constituent elements in the new moral frame-work are: The incremental international consent on respect for human rights, ensuring democracy and good governance, preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and countering terrorism. Deterrence and pre-emption have become part of international practice, not only to meet the above objectives but also to counter and remedy conflict situations involving genocide, ethnic or religious persecution, or the need for removing oppressive authoritarian governments.

Deterrence, containment and pre-emption emerged as three interrelated doctrines of state policy and international practice. Containment led to deterrence, and when efficacy of deterrence was likely to fail, pre-emption became the option.

Contemporary application of three doctrines, if one were to trace their operational origins, could be traced to the period of 1991 when the USA decided to counter Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. That the US succeeded in forging an international consensus in the Security Council for a military operation against Iraq under its leadership was in a manner the beginning of the application of principles of containment and deterrence in their current form.

The period 1990-91 marked a watershed in this process in that it witnessed the transformation of the nature of the United

Nations (UN) and the new international environment in which it started functioning. The Soviet Union was in the process of disintegration. The former Soviet Union under Gorbachev was willing to accept the US policy orientations at the UN. Given China's track record of having a detached approach to the UN activities except where Chinese interests were specifically affected, super power consensus in the UN Security Council (consensus among the veto-wielding permanent members of the Security Council), was becoming a progressive reality. Iraq's occupation of Kuwait in 1990 transformed this reality into an operational fact.

The end of the Cold War and resulting trend of the US dominating global power equations made it clear that the UN's policies and activities would be determined by the Western democracies led by the US. This dominance of the US of international politics inevitably led to the phenomenon of containment, deterrence, pre-emptive action moving up from the status of national policies to international policies, conceived and implemented through the UN where possible but through the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and other US led consultative mechanisms, wherever and whenever the US considered it necessary. None of the Members of the UN Security Council was likely to exercise a veto on the Council's decisions impelled by the US, unless they very specifically affected their respective national interests. The likelihood of the permanent members exercising the veto on issues taken cognisance of by the Security Council for larger strategic reasons, for maintaining a balance in international relations, palpably diminished.

During the first half of the last decade, the US sought to convert the UN into a more

active and intrusive agency for furthering the processes of the new world order. This practice translated itself into both deterrence and containment getting projected into pre-emptive action.

The first ever Security Council summit of Heads of Government and Heads of State on 31 January 1992, asked the Secretary General of the UN to give concrete shape to these emerging policy orientations, asking him to draft an agenda for peace. This document was ultimately adopted towards the end of 1992. It, for the first time, advocated the adoption of "pre-emptive diplomacy", "preventive action", including the use of coercive force where necessary and the desirability of the UN and its members assuming the responsibility of "peace-making" and not just peacekeeping.

This endorsement of pre-emption, political, and coercive action, in many ways contradicted the respect for the sovereignty of member states and went against the original terms of the UN Charter.

While the apparent purpose of the exercise of "The agenda for peace" was to make the UN a more active and empowered agent for ensuring international peace and stability the reality, which emerged, was that of the marginalisation of the UN. Instead of containment, deterrence and pre-emptive action being based on international consensus, and their application being through the UN, these doctrines were incrementally implemented by the USA and its allies through the NATO or its sub-groupings or even by the US unilaterally.

Leaving aside the first Gulf War, the entire management of the series of conflicts in the Balkans, after the disintegration of

Yugoslavia, was done through the NATO, with just nominal consultations with the Secretary General of the UN and cursory post facto discussions on the situation in the UN Security Council.

Discussions and policy decisions of the NATO in the mid 1990s of the last century legitimised an entirely new rationale for containment, deterrence and pre-emption. The concept of "Rogue States" was formalised. The word "Irresponsible Regimes" became part of the lexicon of international relations. Change of regimes which did not adhere to standards of human rights, good governance and democracy, stipulated by western democracies, and which did not meet the concerns related to these standards was justified and implemented. Defence and foreign policy documents adopted by the Heads of Government and State of NATO countries between 2000 and 2003, have formally affirmed that containment, deterrence and pre-emption are options which the members of the NATO can exercise beyond the original geographical jurisdiction of the NATO.

The Defence Planning and National Security papers adopted by the National Security Council of the US, since 1992, also confirm the intentions of the US Government to implement these doctrines in a selective, regional, and if necessary unilateral framework. This approach found most concrete expression after the terrorist attacks on the US on 11 September 2001. The USA's military operations in Afghanistan and in Iraq between September 2001 and the summer of 2003 were the most concrete expressions of this approach. The three concepts or doctrines of containment, deterrence, and pre-emption have been implemented in the West Asian region over

the last 18 months. The campaign against the Taliban was essentially a deterrent punitive action, consequent upon terrorist violence against the USA, which originated in Afghanistan. Military operations against Iraq was an example of pre-emptive action allegedly to thwart Saddam Hussain's violent regional intentions and elimination of his stockpile of weapons of mass destruction. Policies adopted by the US against Syria and Iran, and the USA ensuring its military presence in various Central Asian and West Asian countries, under the umbrella of NATO partnership for peace programme and under the bilateral stationing of forces agreement represent the policy of deterrence against potential threats to the US interests and regional security. The basic characteristics of implementation of these policies are:-

- (a) The US assertively taking the lead in policy decisions backing it up with human resources as well as financial resources.
- (b) The US policy decisions shall be carried forward, if feasible, through the catalyst of the UN; if not, the US will carry on regardless.
- (c) The US will co-opt other friendly governments, particularly Western democracies in the processes of implementation of the policies of containment, deterrence and pre-emption.
- (d) The US will retain overall control and command of the operational aspects of the implementation of these policies.
- (e) The US is willing to carry on alone even if some of its major allies have

reservations about the USA's policy orientations.

(f) The US is willing to risk opposition and resentment from civil societies in countries where it is implementing its policies of containment, deterrence and pre-emption, where the US interests or the USA's perception about collective regional interests are at stake.

Macro-level political and strategic consequences of this approach are:-

(a) The USA's willingness to take unilateral political and military action rooted in its overwhelming military, technological and political power.

(b) The more or less complete marginalisation of the UN as the entity responsible for the maintenance of international peace and security.

(c) A confirmed erosion of national sovereignty of states at given points of

time when they are targets of policies of containment, deterrence and pre-emption.

All this means a negation of principles and conditionalities accepted by the International Law and the UN Charter for collective international action to meet conflict situations and to maintain international security. The political, legal and strategic norms governing inter state relations are undergoing profound transition moving towards some kind of Pax Americana in the foreseeable future.

Managing the overarching influence of the US in security and strategic matters is the most important challenge that other nation-states face today. Confrontation with the US is not the solution. Engagement with the US to temper its unilateralist assertiveness seems to be the only option available for structuring the emerging world order on the basis of minimal levels of equilibrium and equality. This seems to be the only practical approach.

FIRST SESSION : SECOND PAPER**MR YE RU'AN, VICE PRESIDENT CACDA**

The terrorist attacks on the United States on 11 September 2001 served as a catalyst for the Bush Administration to speed up the formulation of its new national security strategy, which is largely based on the worldview and strategic thinking of the neo-conservatives. Within a little more than one year through the end of 2002, the Administration had released six major official documents on the new US strategy. These are:-

- (a) The Department of Defence (DoD) Quadrennial Defence Review (QDR).
- (b) The new Nuclear Posture Review (NPR).
- (c) National Strategy on Homeland Security.
- (d) The Annual Defence Report by the Secretary of Defence to the President and Congress.
- (e) The National Security Council's (NSC's) US National Security Strategy signed by President Bush in September 2002.
- (f) The NSC National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction.

In addition, in his address to the Union to the Congress on 29 January 2002 President Bush referred to North Korea, Iran and Iraq as the "axis of the evil". And speaking at the West Point graduation ceremony on 1 June 2002, he threatened to take preemptive strikes at "rogue states" that seek weapons of mass destruction and support and shield terrorists and terrorist organisations. Two weeks later, at a fund-raising meeting of the

Republican Party he defined the "pre-emption" as "a new doctrine" and directed the National Security Council to write it into the forthcoming Presidential National Security Strategy as a cornerstone of the Administration's new security policy.

Since the breakup of the former Soviet Union and the disintegration of the bipolar world, the overall strategic goal of the United States has been to prevent the rise of any emerging power that might challenge the US leadership role in the world, establish a new international order under the dominant influence of the US and build and maintain a "unipolar world" with the United States as the perpetual single superpower. If one reads through all those reports and documents and closely follows what Bush and his associates have been saying and doing in the past two years, it is not difficult to see some of the major elements and distinct features of the new US strategy generally referred to as the "Bush Doctrine".

First of all, the new strategy tends to amplify the "multiply external threats" the US is now confronted with. It stresses that uncertain and unpredictable threats and "present-day dangers" have fundamentally transformed the US security environment and that the traditional deterrence strategy would not work in countering these threats. By painting a bleak picture of the "imminent dangers", the Bush Administration may justify itself for an increased budget from Congress for military buildup and for expanded overseas military presence in certain key areas. As Congress has approved, the Financial Year (FY) 2004 military expenditure reaches a record high of over US\$ 400 billion in addition

to US\$ 87 billion earmarked for the postwar reconstruction expenses in Iraq and Afghanistan.

A second feature of the new strategy is the increased reliance on military power playing the "key role" in the US overseas interventions. The long-term US defence planning is to build an "overwhelming" military force "beyond challenge" with which to maintain the US absolute military superiority for decades to come. For this purpose, the DoD introduced the concept of moving from the "threat-based" approach to a "capability-based" approach, and decided to build "a new triad" (consisting of the traditional strategic "triad", the response force and defence infrastructure) that combines strategic offence with strategic defence, nuclear forces with advanced conventional capabilities.

Third, the new US strategy emphasises that in order to advance the US interests, the United States would not hesitate to act alone even disregarding some international treaties and norms and without caring about the opposition from the overwhelming majority of countries, including some of its closest allies. Senior US officials often argue that the US remains committed to international treaties and agreements. But international public opinion has criticised and condemned a series of unilateralist acts by the United States. When failing to get international support or reach consensus within the western alliance such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), the US tends to set up "coalitions of the willing" in addressing security issues. As a matter of fact, this is a mere variant of unilateralism, because such US-initiated and US-led ad hoc groups of countries are acting upon the will of the United States rather than equal partnership as the basis.

Fourth, perhaps the most threatening

notions in the new US strategy are "preemption" and "regime change". After the 11 September 2001, it was generally acceptable to the international community for taking preemptive strikes against the Al Qaeda terrorist networks, and the removal of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. However, later on the Bush Administration shifted to target a number of "rogue states" which the United States regards as enemies. According to such notions, as long as the US determines that it is under a "looming threat" from any of these countries, it has the right to take whatever preemptive action it deems fit including large-scale armed invasion to remove the regime. It is arbitrarily interpreted as "legitimate self-defence". If these notions were to be adopted, as was noted by Kofi Annan, "it could set precedents that could result in a proliferation of unilateral and lawless use of force; with or without justification," and all relevant international laws and universally acknowledged norms and principles such as non-aggression, non-interference in the internal affairs of states, inviolability of national sovereignty, the right to self-defence, peaceful resolution of international disputes, etc. would be turned upside down. No wonder, these assertions were rebutted by many legal experts and rejected by the international community outright.

The new US strategy is by and large based on the neo-conservative worldview and strategic thinking. It is not only because, many hardliners from the neo-conservative camp hold many key positions in the Bush Administration's decision-making circle, but because most of the strategic concepts and policy lines contained in those official documents find their origins in their policy studies and recommendations produced in the past decade. Just take a few examples.

As early as in 1992, Paul Wolfowitz who was the number three man in the Pentagon at the time and who was considered to be the chief ideologue and theoretician of the neo-conservatives presented a secret report titled *Guidelines for Defence Planning* in which he formulated a set of new theories. His main idea was that after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the United States possessed unrivaled military power and enjoyed a predominant position in the world. The US needs to join certain adhoc coalitions. When consensus could not be achieved in international organisations such as the United Nations (UN) or the NATO for collective moves, the US could and should act alone or with coalition partners. The report proposed that it was imperative to take preventive strikes at certain states that were seeking or already possessed nuclear, chemical and biological weapons. In January 1998, four heavy weight neo-conservatives wrote an open letter to Bill Clinton in which they urged him to formulate a new strategy the primary objective of which was to topple the Saddam regime. And in September 2000, the neo-conservatives formed a new right-wing group called "New American Century Project" which set out a blueprint strategy for the US to meet new challenges in the new century and called for taking preventive actions against "rogue states" to ensure maintenance of the US leadership under "Pax Americana".

As regards the impact of the Iraq War, which itself is a big subject; it is safe to say that the Iraq War, with its pre-war crisis and post-war controversies, constituted the most prominent global security issue in 2003, rather than a regional conflict. Here the Bush Doctrine was put into practice. The result is: the United States "won the war, but lost in peace", which means that the US succeeded in setting up new military strongholds in the

Middle East and the Gulf region, but it has lost moral and political ground. Saddam Hussein and his Republic Guards were no match for the overwhelming US forces, and Saddam was so isolated and discredited that no country supported him. But no one had expected that the US troops would have little resistance and that the Iraqi regime would crumble so quickly. After nine months of occupation of the country by the US, Iraq remains in a shambles; and the US soldiers have been killed every day and the US has been encountering mounting difficulties in forming a new Iraqi government that would be acceptable to the Iraqi people and legitimately recognised by the international community. The US is under growing international pressure to return sovereignty to Iraqi people and withdraw its troops.

The Iraq War has had and will continue to have a major impact on international relations. It may take some more time to see the war's long-term impact clearly. The most serious impact of the war is that it has shaken the foundation of the existing international legal system on which many fundamental principles and international norms and the UN Charter are based. It has undermined the authority of the UN and the UN Security Council (UNSC). It is universally recognised that the UNSC is the most authoritative world organisation in handling international disputes and security issues. The US defiance of the UN authority made "the last 12 months very painful" for the international body. Here, I would like to quote a passage of an article titled "A Wounded United Nations" which appeared in *the New York Times* of 2 January 2004, which reads :

...the Bush Administration's taste for unilateral action and its doctrine of preventive war pose a profound

challenge to the UN's founding principle of collective security and threaten the organization's continued relevance, chipping away at the multilateral diplomatic system that America did so much to build in the past two generations. It has walked away from the Kyoto Protocol on global warming, waged war against the International Criminal Court and disparaged international arms control agencies and weapons inspectors. The war in Iraq brought these conflicts to a new height. Washington's rush to invade Iraq split the Security Council in ways that have still not healed. ... The US still needs the UN's unparalleled ability to confer international legitimacy and its growing experience in national-building.

If the neo-conservative views and policy lines continue to prevail in the Bush Administration in its second term, the role of the UN may be further weakened or marginalised in international security affairs. In this regard, the Iraq War has set an extremely bad precedent. Secondly, the war has divided the world and most international and regional organisations, as witnessed in the Security Council, the NATO, the European Union (EU), the Arab League, and so on. Such divisions might hinder future regional and international cooperation. If another crisis emerges, particularly if it involves the United States, sharp disputes may recur. Thirdly, the war has caused an unprecedented rift and deep scar in the Euro-Atlantic alliance which is very difficult to heal despite the recent efforts by the US and its traditional allies to repair the relationship, because the

differences are indeed profound and enduring. Fourthly, the war has added to the differences and conflict of interests existing between the United States on the one hand and other big powers and other countries on the other. Obviously, no country that has normal relations with the United States wishes to be directly confronted with the US. But such differences would have a negative effect in their relationship. Fifthly, one of the goals of the US in unleashing the war in Iraq is allegedly to democratise the Arab-Muslim world and remould the Middle East and the Gulf States in tune with the American values. That would exacerbate the anti-American sentiments in the region which might bring about more violence and more terrorist suicide bombings, mainly targeted against the United States and possibly Israel. I suspected that, the Middle East would be the most unstable hot spot in the world in the next decade. Finally, what would be the impact of the war on the new US strategy? This is an open question. My own view is, the Bush Administration would not change the basic concepts, policies and strategy in any major way. However, in view of the hardships being encountered in the postwar nation building in Iraq, with many issues not getting resolved with military means or by coalitional efforts, the US might act with more restraint in future in implementing the strategy. Of course, there might be another scenario, and that is: If Bush get re-elected in November 2004 and the neo-conservatives become more powerful, then there would be more armed conflicts and wars, more "preemptive strikes", more "regime changes" in the world. A new blueprint for this scenario has already been drawn in the new book *An End To Evil: How to Win the War* authored by David Frum and Richard Perle. But I am convinced that such a neo-conservative dream would never come true.

FIRST SESSION : THIRD PAPER

VICE ADMIRAL PS DAS, PVSM, UYSM, VSM (RETD)

Introduction

It should now be clear to anyone that the war in Iraq had nothing to do with weapons of mass destruction (WMD) or with any threats to America's security, direct or indirect. Similarly, there is little evidence to show that Saddam Hussein had links with any terrorist movements on America's watch list. Yet, in the face of stiff opposition from several of its allies and without the sanction of the United Nations (UN), the USA chose to go to war, something which nation states resort to only when their vital interests are seriously threatened. It is, therefore, obvious that Operation 'Iraqi Freedom' was undertaken to serve long term strategic interests of the USA and that the reasons given for the provocation were only a means to the end. In order that America's motivations should be better understood, it is necessary that the larger issues should be seen in the correct perspective.

Effects of 11 September 2001

There is a view that the terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001 mark a watershed and that they are a defining moment in the strategic thought processes of America. It has been argued that, on this day, the USA has moved from the threat of Communism to the threat from Islam. Just as the former was sought to be contained in the 50 years following World War II, the latter will be confronted in the next 50 years. In fact, this confrontation would be undertaken with greater hostility and aggressiveness because of the asymmetric advantages enjoyed by the rogue states and non-state actors. Thomas Friedman, writing in *The New York Times* on

9 January 2004 mentions that 11 September 2001 should be seen as the day on which World War III began.

The other view is that nothing has changed in substance though 11 September 2001 may have acted as a catalyst and speeded up the process of unilateralism in America's policy. Changes in the country's thought processes had begun much earlier, soon after the collapse of the former Soviet Union. The argument goes that the Gulf War of 1991 was as much for the liberation of Kuwait as for sending messages about America's overwhelming military and technological capabilities. This war was followed by other unilateral and aggressive demonstrations of the USA's new approach in the cruise missile attacks on the camps of Osama bin Laden in Afghanistan and on the alleged chemical weapons manufacturing facilities in Sudan. These attacks were not carried out by precision bombs dropped from aeroplane, which many countries can do but by Tomahawk cruise missiles launched from ships and submarines which can be done only by the USA and its main ally, the UK. And, finally, in the war in Kosovo, America acted unilaterally, and without the sanction of the UN. These demonstrations of preemptive and unilateral measures took place before 11 September 2001 and not after it. So, while the terrorist attacks in New York and in Washington may have traumatised the country and contributed to stiffening of resolve, the shift in strategies actually predates that event.

New US Strategies

There are several articulations of

American strategy, beginning soon after the end of the Cold War, which point to the shift in its view of the world and of its position in it. It would suffice to consider only two. One of these is the Clinton White House document of October 1998 which outlines a National Security Strategy for the New Century and the other, the Bush National Security Strategy of September 2002. The two documents represent the thinking of two different administrations, one of the Democrats and one of the Republicans, and two different time frames. One is before 11 September 2001 and the other, after it. A study of these two documents reveals no significant difference in perspectives or of strategies. The thrust of both is that the USA should be the pre-eminent power in the world and that the global political and economic orders should be consistent with its interests. It should also remain overwhelming and superior in its military and technological capabilities which should remain beyond challenge. It should have unrestricted access to and influence over critical raw materials and energy resources, these being essential inputs to the economies of the 'free world.' Clinton had argued that proliferation of WMD must be prevented and Bush now calls for the same through the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI). Both argue that promotion of democracy is a core US objective even as both have dealt and are dealing with authoritarian governments. Clinton was equally firm on combating terrorism, establishing that it predates 11 September 2001 while Bush takes 'preemptive and preventing action' a notch further by arguing that it is necessary because rogue states and non-state actors are not persuaded by deterrence. Both advocate proactive US leadership in the new world order.

It is remarkable how similar these two

documents spelling out US strategies are. The language used in them is different; more suave and sophisticated of the Clinton presidency, more direct and harsh in that of Bush, but the substance and essentials are the same. In sum, both desire that the USA should :-

- (a) Oversee an international political order, which is responsive to US's interests.
- (b) Promote a free and globalised market environment in which US's interests are safeguarded and enhanced.
- (c) Have access to and influence over critical raw materials and energy resources.
- (d) Have sole control of sophisticated technologies so that its military superiority can remain unchallenged.

Since these are, by implication, vital national interests, it follows that should any of these be seriously threatened, the USA would not hesitate to go to war, alone (unilaterally?) if necessary.

In 2003 the Pentagon carried out a net assessment to identify possible challengers to the US preeminence in 2025. Its conclusion was that only China can be in a position where it might pose any challenge. If we add this to what has been discussed above, the focus of America's concerns becomes clear. In the immediate and foreseeable future, terrorism, from rogue or immoderate states and non-state actors, will threaten the US national interests. In the longer term, the challenge could come from China. Both the immediate and the long term concerns need to be addressed. It is in this overall context that the US strategies need to be viewed.

Emerging Security Environment

With the collapse of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republic (USSR) and neutralisation of the communist threat in Europe, the focus of global security environment has shifted to the Asia-Pacific. The main concerns of the USA are located here. The 'immoderate' or 'rogue' states, almost all of them Islamic, are littorals of this region. The non-state actors, or terrorists, are mainly present in this region spread across the Middle East, South West, South, Central and South East Asia and receive patronage and funding from these states. The region holds 65 per cent of all oil reserves in the world and 35 per cent of gas. The economies of Japan, India and many other nations are critically dependent on the oil and gas lifeline from the Gulf. The USA, itself, imports 20 per cent of its energy needs from this region. Even China is now an importer of Gulf oil with a rising demand. Production levels, pricing, routing and safe transportation of energy have, therefore, become very important.

Then, there is China. With a billion plus population, strategic capabilities and an economy which will be the second largest in the world in the next two decades, China is seen as the only possible challenger to the US supremacy in the long term. Its linkages with Russia, India and other potentially important countries can further enhance its leverages. It is also a very large market for American manufacturers and has, therefore, to be engaged and contained at the same time. In this overall background, American presence and involvement in this region is now seen as a strategic necessity.

The USA has military presence in East Asia (Japan and South Korea), South Asia (Pakistan and Afghanistan), Central Asia (Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan) and

South West Asia (Iraq, Kuwait, Bahrain and Saudi Arabia). It also has an alliance with Taiwan and strong political and economic linkages with the countries of South East Asia. Its allies, Australia and the United Kingdom (UK), have had military alliance with Malaysia and Singapore through the Five-Power Defence Agreement. In effect, there is a chain of the US military presence spread right across the Asia-Pacific. In addition, America has very strong naval forces at sea, both in the Indian Ocean and in East Asian waters, capable of applying decisive capabilities in support of the US objectives anywhere in the region. This Asia-Pacific presence is seen as critical to immediate and long term US interests. It enables the USA to :-

- (a) Apply pressure on 'immoderate' states to moderate or democratise, consistent with the US interests.
- (b) Exert pressure on non-state actors and on states seen to be supporting them.
- (c) Influence, if not control, energy resources.
- (d) In the long term, contain China.

Some Other Considerations

There has been a general feeling that the emerging US strategies have emanated from a strong lobby of neo-conservatives (neo-cons) who hold important advisory positions in the Bush administration, formal or informal. This may well be so but as has been highlighted earlier, there has been little change in the US position between the Clinton and Bush periods or before and after the 11 September 2001 attacks. Both terrorism and threats from proliferation of WMD pre-date

the Bush Presidency and pre-emption is also not the invention of the present administration. If the action by Bush in Iraq in 2003 was unilateral and unauthorised, so was the action in Kosovo in 1999 by Clinton. The reality is that there has been continuity in the US strategy over the last decade, ever since the collapse of the former Soviet Union. The pre-eminence of the USA can not be wished away and it is most unlikely that the situation can change in the next two decades. Further, there will be an element of unilateralism and aggressiveness in the US postures and countries will need to recognise this and engage America on these terms. There is no other way.

Another aspect concerns the relevance of domestic opinion and opposition from allies. The assessment that domestic discord as seen during the Vietnam years will force America to soften its positions is optimistic. Street demonstrations can be organised easily and should not be exaggerated. Invariably, the American people have supported the use of military for American values e.g. democracy, freedom etc. It is only necessary that an "evil" be identified and Osama bin Laden, Saddam Hussein, Milosovic etc have been painted as such. This is one reason why successive US Presidents have been able to go to war so easily, to liberate the people from the persecution of their evil leader. Similarly, American people will always be supportive of their military deployed in the field and it will seldom be possible for either of the two major political parties to oppose this as has been seen during the war in Iraq and even now. As far as opposition from allies is concerned, the USA would like to have their support but, in the present environment, is unlikely to be inhibited in its choices should it not be available. In any event, as recent events have shown, countries which opposed

the intervention in Iraq had no hesitation in falling into line even before it ended. France, Russia and Germany had opposed the war vehemently and had not allowed the UN Security Council to give to the USA the sanction that it needed, even threatening to veto the resolution. Yet, soon after the war began, all three countries expressed themselves in favour of a quick victory and ouster of Saddam Hussein. They have also agreed to America's request to waive off Iraq's debts despite the fact that they have been excluded from the list of countries which would be offered construction contracts in the rebuilding of infrastructure in Iraq. So, while opposition from allies cannot be glossed over, its effect should not be exaggerated. It is not likely to cow down the USA which would be quite prepared to act unilaterally if required.

Impact of the Iraq War

Operation 'Iraqi Freedom' was terminated in April 2003. Some may argue that the war is still continuing and that America has lost more soldiers after the war than during it. It is also argued that terrorist threats to the country may actually increase because of the war. Other complexities such as 'body bags' coming home, have also been highlighted. The desire of the Kurds in northern Iraq for independence would have adverse repercussions on the territorial integrity of Turkey and Syria which have their own Kurdish elements. Similarly, should the Shiias of Iraq gain ascendancy and link up with their co-religionists in neighbouring Iran, the situation could have implications on stability equations in South West Asia. 'Body bags' are, no doubt, an important concern in the USA but the composition of the enlisted military is no longer what it was in the Vietnam era and it is most unlikely that the country would abandon its vital interest on that

account. But these are not core issues. The reality is that the USA has achieved its strategic objectives which took it to Iraq. The 'evil' has been thrown out and the people 'freed'. An America friendly temporary regime has been installed in Baghdad and is certain that the new constitution and the new 'democratic' government which follow will be as amenable to the US interests as the present Council is. The USA has now obtained the most suitable presence in South West Asia. It is in a position from where it can pressurise immoderate states and the effects of this pressure on countries like Syria, Iran and Libya is already visible. There is similar pressure on Saudi Arabia and on Pakistan. They all have to reform and become 'moderate'. The pressure on non-state actors can also be better managed from this central location. The USA also has control of Iraq's oil. Iraq has the second largest reserves of oil after Saudi Arabia and America will now have flexibility in its oil leverages versus the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) cartel. It is not inconceivable that pressures will now be put on Saudi Arabia to fall in line with the production and pricing needs of the USA. The war in Iraq has also enabled America to 'promote democracy', first in Iraq and subsequently, in other Islamic states which have not shed their authoritarian and immoderate systems. And after Iraq, the USA has the kind of presence it needs in the Asia-Pacific to meet its long term strategic objective, the containment of China.

Impact on India

For India, the impact is different. From being on the periphery of America's concerns, not even on the radar screen as Robin Raphael once said rather fatuously, it is now in the very centre. Overwhelming American presence in our immediate vicinity is a reality

which has already led to pressures, some of them forcing us to alter long held positions in relations with Pakistan. Similarly, possible military options have been seriously circumscribed. But there is also good news. In an Asia-Pacific dominated by overwhelming US presence, the potential for military conflict between major nation states has decreased sharply unless it suits the interests of the super power. So, military threats to India's security have diminished. The ability of countries like Pakistan to promote terrorism in Jammu and Kashmir or elsewhere in the country has also decreased. India and America share common interests in the safe movement of commerce, especially energy, in the shipping routes of the Indian Ocean and this injects a convergence in the relationship. Finally, the US influence over Gulf oil is not inimical to India's interests; it may even be advantageous. But if India is to make use of the developing environment, it must have capabilities which will be meaningful to the larger players and credible to the others. The nuclear posture has enhanced our political leverages while economic growth will make India an important Asian country. In the same vein, we must have credible military capabilities, especially at sea. The Prime Minister's remark that India's security concerns are not just on our land frontiers but stretch from the Gulf coast in the west to the coast of South East Asia in the east, points to the growing need to enhance our maritime capabilities.

Conclusion

It will be realistic to assume that the present environment of dominating and unilateral American postures will continue in the foreseeable future, certainly for the next two decades. But sooner or later, things must change. The USA may find that it is over

stretched in its anxiety to maintain its pre-eminent position. As the bigger countries and economic groupings develop their economies, they will tend to become essential to the growth of the US economy. A network of growing economies can temper the present unilateral trend. Just as military networking was the essence of the Cold War, economic networking will be the key element of international relations in the first part of the new century. India has some points of difference with the USA such as in nuclear matters, access to cutting edge technologies and the World Trade Organisation (WTO) issues. But it also has some cards of its own. The influential Indian diaspora is one of them. India is also a resource pool for information

and knowledge based industry with as many as 100 of the Fortune 500 companies having research and development established in India. It is a reasonably large market and its economic growth will make it one of five or six largest economies in the world in the next two decades. These strengths cannot be ignored, even by a country as omnipotent as the USA. It is, therefore, inevitable that the world will change, from one in which overwhelming unilateralism holds sway, to one in which there are quite a few reasonably strong players. But this will only happen if these nation states, ours being one, recognise the existing realities and shape their strategies to adjust to them, not losing sight of their long term interests.

DISCUSSANTS

Shri. Bharat Karnad

There are obvious points of similarity in the Indian and the Chinese views about the American policy as evidenced in the presentations made by Mr Ye Ru'an, Shri JN Dixit and Vice Admiral PS Das.

The USA's strategy of preemption and preventive war (as manifested in Iraq), can be sourced to the absolute notions of security entertained by the George W Bush Administration. This has resulted in Washington's seemingly adopting not just the security perspective and mindset of a small, beleaguered country with an extremely small margin of error when it comes to national security of the kind, say, Israel is perhaps more justified in realising. It has also mainstreamed the idea of the "rogue" state first conceptualised by the Hebrew University political scientist Yezekiel Dror in the 1970s, who had also recommended pre-emptive action against such states. The trouble is when the pre-eminent power of the day, like the United States, seeks absolute security for itself – without concerning itself with the negative effects and consequences on other states – then it spells absolute insecurity for everybody else.

It may be, as Vice Admiral PS Das says, that the current American strategy will centrally denature the threat posed by Pakistan. This, however, is to think short-term, because going by the statements repeatedly made by senior US Administration officials, like Under-Secretary of State for Arms Control John R Bolton, a nuclear weaponised India is perceived as a "counterproliferation" problem by the US to the same degree as Pakistan is. And there is no gainsaying that the pre-emption policy targeted at Saddam's Iraq and increasingly

at Pakistan today will not be turned against India tomorrow. The only difference is that while Pakistan may face forceful means, India is sought to be pre-empted through peaceful instruments. Like the promise of high-technology transfers and cooperation in areas of civilian nuclear research and space, and offers of missile defence. Once New Delhi joins up with the US in missile defence, for instance, Washington will logically argue that now that the nuclear threat to India is reduced, New Delhi should consider curtailing its nuclear weapons programme with the objective eventually of eliminating it.

Moreover, the promise of cutting edge technology is more rhetorical than real, because "dual" use technologies for potential use in the Indian nuclear weapons and missile programmes, Washington says, will continue to be denied to Delhi. But the notion of "dual use" is elastic and can and will be stretched to cover within its ambit almost every technology India most desires. This reveals an inability to learn from the past. For example, it was only as a result of technology denial regimes (like the Nonproliferation Treaty and the Missile Technology Control Regime) that the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) and nuclear establishment felt compelled to develop sensitive technologies indigenously, the reason why India became a nuclear weapon state and missile power in the first place. It is a certainty that what technologies will be accessible to India will be those that the country can buy from other sources as well.

Looking at the larger picture and the emerging nature of threats, the fact is there is a certain convergence of the Indian and the US interests. Hence, there is need for issue-based coalitions with not just the US,

but also China (as happened at Cancun, in the global trade talks) and Russia among the major players. This will, as the Prime Minister Vajpayee has realised, at once generate many more options in any particular contingency in any given situation. Jumping thoughtlessly on the American bandwagon could sour relations with the lesser states in the region and elsewhere, especially as India's centrality in the Indian Ocean endows it with attributes the smaller, littoral, states will be happy to utilise to further common interests.

And, insofar as the US offers a paradigm for the success of its strategic policy, India should emulate it, starting with an expansive strategic vision. The US articulated its Monroe Doctrine in 1823 when it was not a global power. The Governor General of India around the same time, Lord Minto, conceived of "distant defence" with the Indian defence perimeter defined as the quadrant — east African littoral up to the Caspian Sea, the line then running eastward through Central Asia before dropping down way east of the Malacca Strait and Australia's west coast and deep into the southern reaches of the Indian Ocean. This latter kind of vision has been lost and a diplomatist's mindset of working out tactical solutions for immediate problems and crises is the bane of India's foreign and military policies. The sooner India begins to think genuinely strategically the sooner it will realise its great power potential.

Mr Zheng Ruixiang

In this session we have had three speakers who have made very good presentations. I would like to make a few points.

Firstly, the new US strategy is to maintain the pre-eminent power status as mentioned by Vice Admiral PS Das. The new strategy appears to be to establish a new

world order consistent with American interests and to maintain American supremacy. Also the speakers have mentioned unilateralism. The US is pursuing a more aggressive unilateralism. The USA by-passed the UN and attacked Iraq. Unilateral actions are violations of the main principles of international relations like sovereignty of states as given in the UN Charter. Vice Admiral Das mentioned that America's new strategy in the Asia-Pacific region and the US military presence would have its impact on India as well as China. This demands an in-depth analysis. I am not in full agreement with the conclusions that American military presence in Asia-Pacific is a chain or encirclement of China. There are both advantages and disadvantages for India as well as China. I agree with Vice Admiral Das that India should develop its economy and become stronger. Also China and India should cooperate in international forums and we should make efforts in bilateral and multilateral forums for cooperation to make multi-polar world order. He also rightly pointed out that sooner or later things must change. I would add that things are changing. As two large developing countries, India and China have a lot of potential areas for cooperation bilaterally and multilaterally.

Shri JN Dixit gave us details of the history and background of evolution of containment, deterrence and pre-emption. Professor Ye Ru'an elaborated on the impact of Iraq war on the world, major power relationships, and the US-European Union (EU) relations. I feel enlightened with these analyses.

The last point I would like to emphasise is that we should look at both the continuation of the American security strategy and the new strategy to firm up pragmatic and strategic views. India and China should try and make their own comprehensive security and economic development strategies.

Chairman's Remarks

Both Vice Admiral PS Das and Mr Ye Ru'an refer to the US National Security Strategy 2002. In the document there is a statement that no country can deal with the threats alone and there is a need for joint action. That is the irony of the whole thing and having put that down in the national security strategy in 2002 they went alone in dealing with Iraq. Let us examine the issues that merit some discussion.

The aspect as referred to by Mr Ye Ru'an about the strategy of the neo-conservation. Vice Admiral PS Das qualified that it was not solely a strategy resorted to by the Bush administration but by the Clinton administration as well. When you look back, the start of this trend was possible when the US ditched the UN in order to go ahead. As Vice Admiral PS Das pointed out, at that point of time it suited the French and Germans. So they went along. But later they did not. But the more important thing is that after that Kosovo intervention which was undertaken without the approval of the Security Council the Americans went back to the Council to set up the UN administration. I do not think China or Russia took a strong position about it. In fact the Russians jumped in straight away to form part of the post intervention apparatus that was set up.

The second aspect is about the regime change. The total American approach there was to remove Milosevic. At what stage it was decided one does not know. But at a certain stage they had decided that Milosevic had to be removed and they went about doing so. Therefore, removing Saddam was no great revelation once they had decided they had to find the means to remove him.

In this context since we have a session

on the impact of all these on the UN and the relevance of the UN in Session III tomorrow, we can pend it to that session.

The third point is how the Americans have resorted to unilateralism in prosecuting the war and how they have messed up the post war scenario. It will be useful to dwell at least for a while on what is the international community to do for the Iraqi people? After all the Iraqis are suffering for all this. The Iraqi people are going through hell for the last 13 to 15 years with the sanctions, the war with Iran and the Gulf Wars I and II. As things are shaping today, and if the Americans fail in Iraq, is it going to cause the rest of us greater problems in terms of increase in terrorism? Would the terrorists consider that they have succeeded and, therefore, in some ways move beyond Iraq? As it is many of our countries are suffering the effects of the terrorist activities and would those grow?

As mentioned by Mr Re Yu'an there is rift in the trans-Atlantic alliances. This is debatable. When it comes to the economic considerations post Iraq, things start settling down. I am sure the Germans and the French would jump aboard and would share the piece of pie. The rift in the trans-Atlantic alliance is over-stated. In many ways it is there. The source of the rift is the huge technological gap between the United States and Europe. The technological gap is staggering and the Europeans are suffering from it.

Two other points which need to be flagged are the impact of the American unilateralism and the way in which they are handling the situation in Iraq, on the domestic constituencies. If the Bush administration gets re-elected, then obviously the American public endorses the action that has been taken. But if the people in the USA, feel that American unilateralism is not the answer to things, and

if that constituency is powerful enough to effect a change that is something, we could briefly deliberate.

The last point which needs some discussion is the Islamic factor. Can we look

at it as a civilisational clash? This is something which effects not only our country, but all countries. Therefore, it might be worth a while to throw some ideas about on that and to clarify our minds.

GENERAL DISCUSSION

**Air Vice Marshal Viney Kapila, AVSM,VrC
(Retd)**

Iraq is the litmus test of the pre-emption doctrine. Therefore, should the world expect the US to compromise, or stop short of attaining its political and economic objectives? My guess is 'No'. Can, therefore, Iraq be the Achille's heel of the USA? Let it bleed both in casualties and economically, till it realises that it is a bad option and it reverts to the UN to take control of the political and economic recovery. Secondly is it not in India's and China's interest to see that the US is kept out of South Asia?

**Lieutenant General BS Malik, PVSM,AVSM
(Retd)**

Unilateralism of course has been much abused, and has been understood very negatively. One would like to know as to what is China pursuing in South East Asia? The second question is about the Chinese concept of absolute security. If we pursue that path, then it is unending state of war and hence what one understands from these translated Chinese writings is that one has to live with "better form of insecurity".

Colonel Gurmeet Singh

In deterrence and containment the biggest tool is the leverage and its ability to dictate terms within the world order. When we analyse this aspect we find the best three cards which contribute towards the leverages are the economy, advanced technology and research and development. The US has a clear cut supremacy in these aspects. The biggest challenge today is how to counter unilateralism either individually, bilaterally or collectively? Two billion plus consumers of India, Russia and China cannot be ignored.

Secondly, the research and development base of Russia, China and India combined have a great potential. Unilateralism can be brought down using these strengths.

Apart from this is the disturbing factor of over reliance on the historical and emotional mindsets of these countries in resolving bilateral and multilateral issues. There have been many irritants like the border issue which have an overbearing effect on conflict resolution. How can the irrelevancy of such issues be further explored so that a better bonding of bilateralism and multilateralism to contest unilateralism can be created?

Mr Ye'Ruan

As regards China's approach to the American unilateralism, China is opposed to the way the United States launched the war against Iraq. Yet when it was over and in the aftermath there was a question as to what good had be done to the world, to the international community and the Iraqi people? As a matter of fact the Iraqi people have suffered a lot. In this regard, the predominant position of China is, how to revive the UN, and how to have the transfer of sovereignty back to the Iraqi people and how to bring back peace in Iraq. China in the Security Council has tried to engage the United States and not confront it. So, we together with other member states as well as members like France and Russia proposed a series of amendments to the US draft, emphasising clear-cut role for the UN in the post War Iraq. And there should be a very clear timetable for the occupying authorities to transfer back sovereignty to the Iraqi people. With these efforts from all sides, the United States may compromise and accept it.

Although it may not satisfy the majority of members, but they should understand that was what could be achieved. Though second best; it is more realistic. China accepts it. Even Syria which drew a lot of attention, accepted the resolution. But that does not mean that all the supportive members have given up their reservation with regard to the war. But in the post-war rehabilitation, the UN in principle has taken back the role and it has been recognised by Resolution 1551. This is a breakthrough of multinationalism because if left to the US alone, it would have used the UN as a rubber stamp. Resolution 1551 has the UN roped in although it is not clear cut as regards the time frame for transfer of sovereignty back to the Iraqi people.

In general I agree with Mr JN Dixit with regard to the unilateralism of the United States. The most effective approach may not be confrontation, but engagement. The UN Resolution 1551 is one example of engagement, which tries to reduce the negative side of unilateralism.

Brigadier VK Nair, VSM (Retd)

We have been talking about deterrence. During the visit I made to the USA, I found a drop in the confidence level of their philosophy of deterrence. So much so that four major committees were created in the US to re-analyse deterrence as it was and where it is going and how the United States with its unique role and military capability would manage it. These led to six papers including one on pre-emption. In their discussions, they had a serious question mark in their minds about China, China's deterrence policy, NMD, TMD and so on. These factors make them to doubt their own ability to make deterrence work. My question is, has the deterrence capacity of the Chinese nuclear capability slipped because of the TMD and NMD threat?

Lieutenant General YM Bammi (Retd)

My question is regarding what Mr. Ye Ru'an said about the impact of policy of pre-emption of the United States on South East Asia. I would like to ask the panel regarding areas of concern post-Iraq pre-emption policy of the United States in South East Asia. I will flag three for you :-

(a) North Korea, which has already been identified as a country of the axis of evil.

(b) The Islamic countries perceive a threat from this policy of the United States. Malaysia is one example. Dr Mahatir before retirement in September 2003 stated, "the United States feels that our type of democracy and our type of Government is not what is liked by them". Then are we going to be the next target? In Indonesia, the President said that if the United States tomorrow feels that we are not doing enough to combat Islamic militancy in the country, we may be the next target.

(c) Most important from China's point of view is the position of Japan vis-à-vis North Korea. The Japanese Diet in its last session deliberated that, if they are convinced that North Korea poses a very serious threat, they in that case should be prepared to pre-empt that on their own.

So what should be the response? Mr Re Yu'an said that engagement rather than confrontation is likely to succeed. May I request your views on these scenarios as to what is the reality? If, post Iraq, the United States feels that they have succeeded in achieving their national objectives by pre-emption and the policy can be applied to other countries and regions, what should be the

response from China, India or for that matter from South Asia and South East Asia?

Shri SK Bahl

My question is linked to the civilisational war. When VS Naipaul was here, there was a debate in terms of Islamic terrorism and the war of civilisations. In the West also, there has been talk of wars that took place seven or eight centuries ago. Now for a period of 50 years or so the erstwhile USSR had a huge stockpile of nuclear weapons and China was also a nuclear power. That did not mean that the Americans had not spent sleepless nights. But now with a few nuclear warheads with the Islamic world, do you not think that there is a big danger a lot more than during the Cold War. Is there a perception in China that in transfer of nuclear technology there is a civilisational context? How is it that today we do not see any danger from nuclear armed America, Russia, France, Britain and China? Why is there a fear from the Islamic world?

Ambassador Li Daoyu

There is a perception that perhaps pre-emptive attacks would be in the Middle East. This is based on political thinking, strategic thinking as well as the military thinking. That is why Iran and Libya opposed that and have adjusted their policies accordingly. The purpose of their adjustment is very clear. It is to avoid a pre-emptive attack. As regards North Korea, it is not easy for the United States to launch a pre-emptive military attack. Were it not the case, the United States would have launched that attack much earlier. That is why the USA is so much dependent on bilateral and multilateral talks. It is actually a kind of contradiction in the US practices. In Iraq it is totally unilateral. Now with multilateralism in North Korea, it is very pragmatic. This also shows the pragmatic side

of the US security strategy. Politically, it is not feasible for the United States to launch pre-emptive attacks on South Asia and South East Asian states. This is out of question.

We are trying our best to relax tensions in North Korea. All these efforts aim to achieve peace and stability in the Peninsula. We believe that non-nuclear weapon zone in the whole Peninsula is conducive to perpetual peace, security and stability. This is in the interest of China as we are engaging in economic development. We do not like to have any tension on our borders. This is also good for all countries in Asia and the world.

Brigadier Gurmeet Kanwal (Retd)

While not holding a brief for the American intervention in Iraq, I would venture to suggest that perhaps not all interventions are bad in intent and even in law. There have been wars of conscience and humanitarian interventions before. For example the situation in Rwanda, was crying out for an intervention for many years. It never came about. Similarly, the situation in Afghanistan did not need to wait for an event such as on 11 September 2001, before the war of intervention. Possibly the regional countries could have got together and intervened. Of course it would not happen but it would have been a good thing if it had happened.

**Vice Admiral PS Das, PVSM, UYSM, VSM
(Retd)**

As regards the point made by the Shri Bharat Karnad about body bags and the Americans anxiety, to say that it worries them as much today as it worried them in Vietnam is perhaps a little exaggerated. The entire complexion of the American military forces has changed during the last 25 years. 50 per cent of the military troops are now Afro-

Americans and Hispanics. The other 50 per cent are white from relatively lower middle class. No longer the children of Senators, Congressmen, Governors and industrialists serve in the US military. So it seems crude to say so, but body bags come a little cheaper in the United States. In any case, when their national interests are threatened, we should not assume that they could change course all that easily.

I would like to respond to the question of encirclement of China referred to by Mr Zheng Rui Xiang. What I had said was that when I was in Beijing in December 2003, I heard it said by a Chinese scholar that this is actually an encirclement of China. I agree that there are other nuances. But looked at from any point of view, the only country in the world today and the foreseeable future, which can be a contender to the United States is China. It has a billion strong people and an economy which is going to be the second largest in the world and the first in the purchasing power parity in 20 years from now. It has strategic capabilities which can target the United States, economic and political linkages with Russia, India, and the ASEAN. Surely China is a very important player for the USA. Apart from that, it is a huge economic market. So it is a country which at the same time needs to be engaged and contained. The Japanese call it the "conengagement". In the times to come, some kind of engagement would be in the offing, and the term of encirclement of China is far fetched now.

Some do talk about the civilisational war. Islamic leaders, like Mahatir Mohammad has talked about that. I doubt very much if in the American thinking and strategies, they are looking at all Islam. I think they are looking at immoderate Islam. Both Condoleeza Rice and Madeleine Albright have said that they would

like all Islamic States to be moderate on the pattern of Jordan, Baharain, Egypt and so on. So to convert this to a civilisational war is being far-fetched.

Shri JN Dixit, IFS (Retd)

If the pre-emption in Iraq fails then the United States reverts the whole management to the UN. Would it work? The point to remember is that when it comes to operational aspects, political will, human resources and the responses of public opinion in Iraq towards the arrangement are the three factors which would matter. Having spent so much money and having put its credibility at stake, even if at some future stage or for some practical purpose, the US lets the UN take over, the USA would still like to play the most important role even under the umbrella of the UN. Of course the people of Iraq would be more at ease with a multilateral umbrella for reconstruction. But the basic thing is that not only in the Iraq example, but since 1992, the political dimensions of UN's credibility have been seriously eroded. It has been reduced to a debating society. In some respects it was a debating society even before and I have direct experience of UN's behaviour during the Bangladesh War. The permanent members of the Security Council could not take a collective view on the manifest genocide going on in Bangladesh and take a stand.

While of course, the UN umbrella is good, I would not attach too much of virtue and credit to it. A group of more number of countries can get together and manage Iraq. But this is going to be a complex task.

Should the US be kept out of South Asia by combined action of China and India? It is totally impracticable. The United States is involved with Asian countries. It is not just

due to the military perception of the strategic defence and threat perception of the US. Regrettably, the ideology of the non-aligned movement that external power should not be there amongst the developing countries is flawed. Even when the non-aligned movement was relevant, the external powers were there. Let us grow up and say well there it is and this is a country with not only the deep involvement but is a country whose presence is desired by countries of the region. It follows that military presence does not exist in a vacuum. It exists in the context of certain other factors of interest where there is mutuality. Why would Uzbekistan sign two agreements – partnership for peace and the stationing of the US forces? Forget Uzbekistan, look at Bangladesh also, and think of Nepal for the last four months. There is a certain US presence in Nepal after the Maoist threat and we have to take note of that. I do not think that we can keep them out of South Asia.

As regards comprehensive security, and what do the Chinese mean by that? I was negotiating with my Chinese counterpart, Mr Tang Jiaxuan, the Vice Minister (presently the Foreign Minister) about the boundary agreement of 1993 and the maintaining peace and tranquillity on the Line of Control. Occasionally, we digressed from the specific subject. When we were discussing the definition of peace and tranquillity, security was referred to. I must say that my counterpart was very articulate. He said that the present Chinese concern is development and economic consolidation of the country. For that we think peace and stability in the region is very important because we do not want our attention diverted by security concerns of a military or political nature. Therefore, when we talk about comprehensive security we are talking about a total approach

where we avoid controversies and confrontations even if a dispute is intractable and difficult like the boundary question with India. This is my perception and the Chinese have a dialectically multi-dimensional approach to security when they talk about comprehensive security.

As regards combined research and development capacities of Russia, China and India, the market and the human resources; can these counter USA's influence? I have a basic question. Why this anxiety to counter USA's influence? The approach should be that; is that influence benign or is it threatening your vital interests? So it is a selective process, where their policies pose a specific challenge to your well being, all that is necessary is to retain the option to react to that alone or in combination with other governments who have similar perceptions. But definitionally saying that an existential reality should be questioned is not correct. The Americans and the Chinese are here. These are the big powers and they sort of permeate your processes of cognition. What India should be equally worried about is Pakistan, Nepal and Bangladesh. These are pin pricks and how does India deal with them? So I do not think that this orientation about a confrontationist approach and combined abilities to counter one country is relevant to the current processes of international politics.

Having said that let me say that even if all these capacities are there, the basic question is, there must be synergy of political will to get them together to counter x,y, or z. That is a very difficult task politically and diplomatically.

As regards civilisational threat and why is it that we are not worried about the nuclear weapon capacities of Russia, the USA or other existing nuclear powers? And there is

great amount of tension and agitation this weaponry being in the hand of Islamic countries. I can only indulge in a speculative assessment. It is the linkage between the inclination towards terror as an instrumentality of policy and the nonchalant attitude about utilising whatever weapon systems they have. It does not go back to only the nuclear weapons and the current stage. In the subconsciousness of non-Islamic civil societies, somehow Islam has got identified with terrorist violence being perpetuated against civilians whether it was the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) activities in the 1960s and 1970s or later. Even when there are non-Islamic terrorist groups operating, whether it is the LTTE or the Red Brigades or the Shining Path or whatever, there is an interesting point that all of them have linkages in terms of sources of finances and arm supplies to Islamic organisation. An additional comment I would like to make is while the Governments of the United States may not be precise in saying that it is not Islam per se but certain segments of extremist Islamic groups who are inclined towards violence, one cannot gainsay the fact that general public there has this sort of prejudices against Islam, particularly Arab Islam and Iranian Islam. This is a subconscious phenomenon which effects the thinking processes because ultimately what ordinary people think gets some resonance in the governmental policies.

All interventions are not bad, and some interventions could be good and some which should have happened but have not happen. To this I agree entirely. The point is that the interventions should have legitimacy, in terms of not only the objective phenomenon which justifies the intervention. This is the first criteria of legitimacy. Secondly, the intervention should not be seen and entirely rooted in your own strategic and individual

interest, but it should have a larger cause behind it.

Mr Zheng Ruixiang

I fully agree with Ambassador Li Daoyu that the best way to deal with the USA is engagement and not confrontation.

Mr Ye Ru'an

Thank you for asking so many questions. I can not answer all of them in a few minutes. I might leave some for the next session.

The first question is of pre-emption and intervention by the US. I agree that pre-emption is not entirely a new concept. In the US history there have been a lot of overseas military interventions mainly in the western hemisphere, Panama, Haiti, Dominica, Granada etc. But more recently, of course, the Kosovo war is an example of pre-emptive military intervention. But it is very different in the Iraq case. Kosovo was an intervention on humanitarian grounds. Milosevic was accused of ethnic cleansing. It was a joint NATO action. The Russians did not do much to support Milosevic. His regime was toppled due to the US bombing. I read the Clinton's directives for certain principles for overseas intervention. He differentiates the vital and key interests. But it was not clear which issue is the key or important one. So this is the difference. My point was that the Bush administration was more reliant on the military means. The Clinton administration relied on engagement and not on massive military intrusion. The Iraqi case was unique, it witnessed a massive ground invasion.

The second point is the USA-Russia relationship. There are different views including those of Chinese scholars. I remember that Kissinger wrote an article in

commemoration of the 35 anniversary of the NATO in which he said that there were constant bickerings or quarrels between the United States and the European partners and both sides could resume their relationship after some time. Suddenly after the Iraq war, in the print media, I read reports that Kissinger was completely surprised and appalled by such diverse interests and deep splits among the US and its European allies. I do not think that the Western alliance would come apart, because they have shared many strategic interests. At the same time, they have differences. German and Chinese scholars do not exaggerate the differences between the USA and the Western Europe.

Another is the Islamic factor. The USA would not pit itself against the entire Islamic world. It would deal with it case by case in its best interest because they want to maintain good relations with others. They need a moderate Islamic world. It is clear that 11 September 2001 was a watershed particularly, in the minds of the American people. Never before, the Americans had casualties in the homeland. They enjoyed the protection of oceans and friendly borders of Canada and Mexico. This left a deep psychological effect on the American people.

For the first time they felt insecure. That is why when the war broke out, the Bush administration linked it to WMD and terrorism. Majority of the public opinion supports the war. This has been a US tradition – to rally behind the President. But it does not mean that there are no differences among the US officials and Congressmen. The main thing is

that under these circumstances at that time, the opposition was weak.

As regards body bags, it was clear that during the war in Vietnam, body bags had a very big influence. But in the case of Iraq, the administration could live with casualties of a few hundred for the security of all American people, even though there were differences of opinion.

I attended a conference in December 2002 in the UK, shortly before the war. Many people had talked about how to influence the US policy in view of the upcoming crisis in Iraq. Very few or none could offer good ideas. This was because the US administration's policy was very determined. It was difficult to sway the basic decision. It is a complex situation.

In the US administration there are toughliners and moderates on many issues including the US policy towards China. There may be more conservatives or hardliners towards China in the Congress. The US administration must consider the long term interests of the US in its relationship with China. In recent years, with improving ties and growth of common ground between the two countries, the Bush administration has a moderate stance towards China. China is not a strategic competitor but a constructive partner. Long term stable relationship between China and the USA is important in mutual interests. That is why in the foreseeable future China is regarded as a potential enemy. But for the overall US interests in the foreseeable future, I would not think the US has any clear plan for the encirclement of China as that is not in the interest of the US.

INTERNATIONAL ARMS CONTROL REGIMES

SECOND SESSION

Chairman : **Ambassador Li Daoyu**

First Paper : **Brigadier VK Nair, VSM (Retd)**

Second Paper : **Major General Luo Bin (Retd)**

Discussants : **Lieutenant General Pran K Pahwa, PVSM (Retd)**
Mr Ye Ru'an

SECOND SESSION : FIRST PAPER

BRIGADIER VIJAI K NAIR,VSM (RETD)

The concept of global non-proliferation - vital as it is to the interests of America and other major world powers - is being torn apart because all significant parties have predicated their participation on a self-serving deception resulting in a tyranny that threatens to demolish the entire structure.

The May 1998 nuclear tests in South Asia are but another event born as a consequence of this debilitating propensity - an inability to address the concept of non-proliferation with the sincerity and integrity required to make it work. The path is strewn with irrefutable evidence as is illustrated by the following :-

- (a) The nuclear weapon states (NWS) unyielding attitude towards their commitment to nuclear disarmament, culminating in their collective rejection of the disarmament agenda at the last Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference.
- (b) The capitulation of the non-nuclear weapon states (NNWS), to an indefinite extension of the NPT in spite of their reservations and subsequent failure to arrive at an honest review of the Treaty's performance.
- (c) Outright violation of Articles 1 and 2 of the NPT by nuclear and non-nuclear weapon states parties to the Treaty.
- (d) The non-acceptance of the menace of proliferation of nuclear weapons, both vertical and horizontal, with NWS or their clients fuelling imperatives in others to exercise the

nuclear option to meet the compulsions of their national security interests.

Global arms control measures, are in my perception, engineered on a set of half truths designed to meet the national interests of the NWS without regard to the aspirations and perceptions of a large segment of the global fraternity. This continues to be a major debilitating factor.

The concept of the Arms Control regime has its origins in the compulsions of the then superpowers, the US and the Soviet Union, to deter each other. This equation had to be predicated on the creation of a stable nuclear weapons environment that would not impinge on acceptable 'balance of power' in the recognised dynamics of the Cold War development of deterrent capabilities. It suggested a regime that would cater for the following:-

- (a) Allow the superpowers freedom for vertical proliferation to cope with each other's emerging technological and doctrinal capacities.
- (b) Freeze horizontal proliferation - especially in those States that had the technological competencies to proliferate and unhinge the recognised balance of nuclear power.
- (c) Impose bilateral checks and balances between superpowers in areas where developments threatened to become unmanageable.

Based on this concept the arms control regime came into being - moved through four

distinct phases until the turn of the century before evolving into the fifth phase which is beginning to manifest itself now.

Phase I - Bilateral Arms Control Measures

In the first Phase the superpowers imposed specific, threat oriented, regulatory mechanisms through bilateral arrangements such as the Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT), the Anti Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty and so on. These instruments were directed to providing stability to the super power nuclear equation. However, with growing competencies in the former Axis Power - Japan, Germany and Italy - and some of the other European States, it soon became obvious that the carefully developed nuclear equation between the US and the Soviet Union was about to collapse. Policy analysts perceived a state of unmanageable nuclear anarchy, which needed to be contained. Simultaneously a growing number of Non Aligned Movement (NAM) States were beginning to feel that the only means of ensuring their security lay in reversing the nuclear genie and put it back into the bottle.

Phase II – NPT

These perceptions led to a seeming convergence of interests - the concept of nuclear non-proliferation was born and became a part of the NWS agenda – a major instrument in the management of the nuclear doctrines and strategy of the NWS. With the exceptional military capabilities of their nuclear arsenals and the political clout by virtue of their P-5 Status, it impelled the original three NWS to engineer the NPT to strengthen their national interests. This was not feasible without making compromises with those States that were on the nuclear weapon threshold themselves - Europe and Japan -

especially Germany that lay between the two super powers.

The NPT was, therefore, designed to accommodate these states - an accommodation that required the super powers to create structures and mechanisms that would extend assured nuclear deterrence to these States in exchange for their agreeing to renounce nuclear weapons. The final compromises were as follows:-

- (a) Instruments of the mechanisms of implementation that provided scope for vertical proliferation.
- (b) An illusory promise to move towards nuclear disarmament that was cleverly linked with an unattainable general disarmament.
- (c) An agreement between the super powers to turn a Nelson's eye on the deployment of their nuclear arsenals on allied territories and territorial waters, thereby giving a reasonable degree of credibility to the "assured deterrence" that they were to extend in exchange for abstinence.

The NPT came into existence as a discriminatory arms control regime wherein the first casualty was the truth. Initially it was boycotted by a number of states including France and China – both NWS that, at the time, did not have the incentive or the means to upset the carefully engineered balance. Equally debilitating was the fact that certain significant states refused to be party to a discriminatory treaty. Consequently this primary arms control arrangement was not universal – a limitation that has had a profound effect to this date.

Phase III - Selective Technology Control Arrangements

The much sought for stability in the nuclear environment soon proved to be illusory. The growing nuclear weapons competencies amongst states not party to the NPT began to undermine the efficacy of the NPT regime. A break out amongst these states added to the reservations of those states party to the NPT as under :-

(a) European powers and the US allies became restive about their having forsaken the option to acquire nuclear weapons of their own.

(b) Other NNWS party to the NPT began to realise that a self-imposed abstinence left them out in the cold in a world where their adversaries had or were creating nuclear weapons arsenals.

One or both superpowers were in the know that a number of states continued with their research, and acquisition of materials, to make nuclear weapons - albeit without crossing the nuclear Rubicon - except for India who tested a nuclear device even before a majority of significant states acceded to the NPT.

The NWS and their surrogates, recognising the threat to their singular position, advanced the arms control measures to the next phase - that of introducing a number of technology denial arrangements, independent of the NPT but geared to safeguard their special status in that regime. They hoped to foreclose further development of nuclear weapons through exclusivity and we saw the birth of the London Club, Nuclear Suppliers Group, Cocom, MTCR, Wassanar, Australia Club and so on.

To the developing countries the selectivity in this attempt at exclusivity soon became quite apparent. Especially as these initiatives did not close the doors to nuclear weapons development in non-nuclear weapon states assisted by the transfer of technology and materials from the developed world or even from states not party to the NPT. A rash of worrisome developments that undermined the efficacy of the NPT and technology denial regimes soon became evident as under:-

(a) Israel secretly acquired an operational nuclear weapons arsenal. To make matters worse, it soon became apparent that these developments were in the knowledge of the Chief Executive of the US.

(b) Switzerland, a NNWS party to the NPT had an ongoing nuclear weapons programme as late as 1988 until it was terminated on 01 November that year.

(c) South Africa developed and produced a small nuclear weapons arsenal. In spite of the US denials, a strong sense of South Africa and Israel having tested their nuclear weapons in 1979 continues to pervade the perceptions of other States.

(d) Iraq and North Korea, both NNWS party to the NPT had reached an advanced stage in the development of nuclear weapons.

(e) If leaked US intelligence reports are to be believed, Iran had also made a start at developing nuclear weapons.

(f) India and Pakistan were reportedly

threshold states with a nuclear weapons capability under shroud of ambiguity. The truth of the matter is that they had both limited nuclear arsenals without validating this through visible nuclear tests.

(g) Taiwan and South Korean nuclear weapons programmes had been closed by the US persuasion through deals, when these were in very advanced stages in the late 1980s.

(h) Reports soon began to surface of collusion by nuclear weapon states, directly or indirectly, by omission or by commission, with NNWS.

It was now quite evident that the concept of exclusivity, while having the affect of slowing down technology acquisition in the developing world, was not a foolproof barrier. The augmentation of technological competencies in the developing countries was matched by more than commensurate increments in technology available to the US by virtue of the phenomenal data bank provided by over 1000 nuclear tests, and to a lesser degree, other nuclear weapon states.

Phase IV - Secondary Arrangements CTBT and Fissile Material Cut off Treaty

This impelled the NWS to the next stage in the evolving concept of the Arms Control regime. The US came to the conclusion that while the NPT could not plug the loopholes of technology competencies, there was a need to freeze nuclear weapons capabilities on a learning curve by disallowing nuclear testing and limiting arsenals by cutting off availability of fissile materials with the NNWS. Therefore, it became essential to supplement the NPT regime by a CTBT and an Fissile

Material Cut Off Treaty (FMCT). In doing so the following was considered :-

(a) The US should retain its capacities to develop, or modify nuclear weapons to ensure the efficacy of its nuclear deterrent for all times. This has been achieved by development of alternate technology and materials to sustain the nuclear arsenal at peak level. Its fissile material stocks are sufficient to see it through the next millennium and the Stockpile Stewardship and Maintenance Programme (SS&MP) is designed to ensure fabrication and design of new nuclear warheads.

(b) Ensure that the other NWS accept this concept by instilling confidence that they can maintain their nuclear weapons capability at the current levels of effectiveness. This required violation of Article 1 of the NPT pertaining to greater flow of technological know-how between the NWS. This too has already been put in place.

(c) Aspirants for nuclear weapon status should not acquire competencies beyond the first generation weapon systems as these cannot be married to the 'state of art' and futuristic delivery systems necessary for assured penetration and high hit probabilities in a futuristic air defence environment.

(d) Limit the size of nuclear arsenals of the developing countries to current level of stocks of fissile material.

The end product of the CTBT is ample evidence of this strategy as it:-

(a) Does not define a 'nuclear explosion'.

- (b) Has no enforceable linkage with nuclear disarmament.
- (c) Allows what the nuclear weapons caucus refers to as "permissible activities" for vertical proliferation without a nuclear test.
- (d) Freezes NNWS, not favoured with technological accessibility, to a learning curve at the bottom of the nuclear weapons technology ladder.
- (e) Legitimises espionage through National Technological Means.

Where to from here? That is the question uppermost in the minds of policy makers and analysts in states such as India where a nuclear weapons capability is considered essential to cater for the national security interests in the current and unfolding nuclear weapons ambience affecting the national well being.

Phase V – The Turn of the Century

At the turn of the century the global nuclear weapon environment is in a state of flux bringing with it new complexities in the global security ambience. It is important to analyse the evolving behavioural pattern amongst NWS who find the potential of their established deterrence mechanisms being threatened and the NNWS who are progressively finding their national interests being restricted by the advanced countries through discriminatory limitations by virtue of their having abjured nuclear weapons.

It is no longer enough to have demonstrated a nuclear-weapons potential by the tests India conducted in May 1998. The elements of deterrence are undergoing changes that have a bearing on the credibility

of the nuclear deterrent. New Delhi claims it has created 'The National Command Authority' and has to put into place a 'credible deterrence' that has flexible structures and systems to meet the demands of the emerging nuclear weapon environment. It is crucial for India to appreciate the objectives of individual states negotiating arms control treaties and arrangements to deduce the fallout on its national security interests and adopt appropriate arms control strategies that would ensure competencies to secure its national security interests today and in the uncertain future.

The Director of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Mohamed ElBaradei, told the French newspaper *Le Monde*, "some 35 to 40 countries could produce nuclear weapons in just a few months," posing a severe challenge to the NPT. While the effects of new entrants will have to be factored into the larger global nuclear matrix the current debilities are many and varied thus compounding the difficulties of nuclear strategy management.

The CTBT has failed to acquire the minimum pre-requisites to enter into force. Two major players – the US and China – have not even ratified the CTBT while two other NWS – India and Pakistan – have chosen not to be party to the Treaty. From the time the CTBT was signed in New York with much fanfare the US, China, and Russia have carried out numerous subterranean nuclear tests in the guise of 'sub-critical' tests. However, as these were not monitored by an independent verification agency there is no way by which the world may know whether these were actually 'sub-critical' tests and not nuclear tests de-coupled to generate seismic signatures below 1 kiloton (KT). Added to this the US, in anticipation of its development

and production of new nuclear warheads has initiated a programme to reduce the lead time to conduct nuclear tests by refurbishing structures and systems at the Nevada Test Site. Requisite resources were allocated in the Energy and Water Development Appropriation Act of 2004 for this purpose and the development of new warheads signalling that the programme is well underway. Allocations included US \$ 7.5 million to develop bunker bursting nuclear bombs, US \$ 6 million to study low yield nuclear weapons, and US \$ 24.9 million to improve the readiness status of the Nevada Nuclear Test Site. These are not paltry sums that are being invested to satisfy a whim, but are serious policy initiatives that suggest the US moratorium on nuclear testing is but a passing phase in the larger context of its nuclear strategy.

The FMCT remains a pipe dream while the proliferation of technological and material means of fissile materials continues unabated. And this at a time when a number of countries are allegedly involved in transferring fissile material enrichment technologies to other states. Undeclared inventories in both Russia and the US are prone to leakages that have resulted in the growth of the 'dirty bomb' phenomenon currently bedevilling the world. The US itself has 1300 reported instances of fissile materials having gone 'walk about'. Media reports suggest that the situation in Russia is far worse. The status in the other NWS may possibly be as bad if not worse. But the Conference on Disarmament (CD) has got bogged down in its efforts to negotiate an indiscriminate FMCT and in the process derailed all other arms control initiatives on its agenda.

The US has sounded the death knell of the NPT by declaring its intent to use military

means, including nuclear weapons, to dissuade NNWS party to the NPT, it suspects of developing nuclear capabilities. Its preemptive strategy based on the counter-proliferation tools developed in the last decade of the 20th Century makes nonsense of the commitment by the NNWS to abstain from developing their own nuclear weapon shield. Revocation of the US Furse-Sprat amendment to the 1994 Defense Authorisation Act signed by President Bush lifts a decade-old ban on research into low-yield nuclear weapons and authorises \$15 million for continued research into a powerful nuclear weapon capable of destroying deep underground bunkers. Just in case there are some amongst us who have not absorbed the gravity of the extent to which vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons is being pursued, it would be prudent to draw attention to the fact that the recently passed Defence Appropriations Act of 2004 includes US \$ 6.3 billion for nuclear weapon activities, which is US \$ 303 million above the previous year's allocations.

Future new designs centred on low-yield weapons in the five kilotons or below range make these inherently more dangerous because they are more likely to be used. This is in breach of the commitment made by the NWS under Article VI of the NPT. It would be safe to assume this US initiative would re-open the no holds barred nuclear weapons arms race that appeared to have subsided at the end of the Cold War. Democrat Representative, Ellen Tauscher, opines, "the US is spurring a new global arms race with our own development of a new generation of nuclear weapons". Warheads 'designed to generate high intensity shock waves to destroy deep bunkers' such as the ones encountered in Afghanistan that were immune to anything in the US arsenal.

There are, however, signs that the US strategy is not limited to developing 'mini nukes' as reported in the media. According to one report the US military, besides the B-61 nuclear bomb, intends to convert the two Megaton B-83 warhead for the same role. If this report has substance the limited enhancement of nuclear capability vis-à-vis development of mini-nukes is only a part of a larger strategy to expand the scope and potential of nuclear weapon strategy currently in place. These are extremely provocative policies, which are drawing a response – not only from other NWS but also with an extended ripple effect on the security perceptions of hitherto NNWS.

China's concerns for the efficacy of its nuclear deterrence in an environment of ballistic missile defence (BMD) has propelled its nuclear modernisation programme including research and development in the realm of satellite kill capabilities. The latter concept threatens not only to degrade the potential of the BMD that the US is developing, but also the accuracies of the existing nuclear weapon systems on which the US deterrence is based. The Chinese nuclear establishment is known to have miniaturised its warheads and has the potential to deploy multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs) that would greatly enhance its ability to saturate an American NMD. Besides a long list of areas in which it is modernising its strategic forces, China has accelerated its space programme with the intent to deploy an independent space station. The latter would give it the potential for a viable satellite kill capability in the future, if required.

Russia continues to upgrade its nuclear weapons capabilities and in no uncertain terms President Putin has declared the intent

to transform Russian strategy and weapon capabilities in keeping with the US formulations for new nuclear warheads and pre-emptive use of these to enhance deterrence and dissuasion. The Deputy Chief of the Russian General Staff, Colonel General Yuri Baluyevsky, told reporters, "We are witnessing that nuclear weapons, which have served as a political deterrent, are being transformed into a battlefield instrument, ... it's very scary, extremely scary." "That causes us concern," Baluyevsky said. "Should we somehow review our nuclear strategy? Yes, I believe we should." While he refrained from disclosing the possible development of new nuclear weapons, he said, that Russia would retain its stockpiles of tactical nuclear weapons. Especially with the expansion of North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) eastwards and the US and UK persisting with their deployment of similar weapons in Europe.

According to a recent report in the Liberation Newspaper "President Jacques Chirac is planning to revamp France's nuclear strategy," which would comprise of adjusting the French strategic doctrine for the 21st Century that was articulated in June 2001. Hard on the heels of this report the French Defence Minister, Michele Alliot-Marie, proclaimed that nuclear arms are "our ultimate protection." Why is there a need for top echelons of the French political leadership to reiterate France's dependence on the Force d' Frappe now, if not to make grounds for a revamp of its nuclear strategy?

Britain, a state that has also declared its right to pre-emptive strikes, is in the process of acquiring and deploying sub-strategic nuclear capabilities on board its Trident fleet. This gives credence to Prime Minister Blair's declaration that the UK

reserves the right to take pre-emptive action against NNWS that may attempt to acquire weapons of mass destruction (WMD). This negates the assurances London provided to the NNWS at Geneva in April 1995 thereby resurrecting the concerns they had prior to giving acquiescence to the indefinite extension of the NPT. Besides these there are signs of substantial stirrings in the nuclear philosophies amongst states not party to the NPT.

Reports have surfaced suggesting that Pakistan is central to alleged horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapon technology amongst Muslim states such as Iran, Saudi Arabia and Libya. Israel is allegedly putting into place a viable sea based nuclear weapon force; and, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) having set a precedence of withdrawing from the NPT professes to have developed and deployed nuclear weapons.

Finally, the changing nature of nuclear weapon capabilities in East Asia, have given rise to nuclear stirrings amongst the Japanese political and strategic elites. For some time now a heated debate has been going on in Japan on whether or not there is a need to change the constitution to enhance the use of its military. According to a recent poll nearly 20 per cent of Japan's lower house of parliament believe that Tokyo should consider becoming a NWS if international developments push the country in that direction. Then what about South Korea and Taiwan – both of whom had fairly advanced nuclear weapon programmes in the 1980s?

The Emerging Arms Control Scenarios

Besides the existing arms control agreements and those still being negotiated at the CD there are new arms control

stratagems being mooted. Two significant initiatives are the Proliferation Security Initiative and unilateral counterproliferation strategies.

The US initiated Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) was launched in Madrid in mid-June 2003. 10 countries agreed to be party to it including Australia, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Spain, and Britain. It is a unilateral counterproliferation move to intercept shipping, air or land transport of possible materials associated with weapons of mass destruction or missiles capable of delivering them and to increase the level of intelligence coordination on weapons of mass destruction. By no means a global agreement, it is nevertheless a US initiated arms control measure, that the parties to the PSI describe as "robust and creative steps" to combat trafficking in a way that they claim "would be consistent with existing domestic and international frameworks". However, the majority of countries have refrained from participating in this unilateral initiative for many reasons. Not the least of which is the legal questionability of intercepting international shipping outside the framework of a legally negotiated international treaty. There is a very fine line between piracy and legal interdiction.

The US government and other member nations of the PSI have opted to bypass the UN processes in their approach toward North Korea. However, their final statement indicates that they expect other countries to get behind their initiative. It said: "As the PSI moves forward, the member countries aim to involve all countries that have the will and ability to take action to address this menace."

The pre-emptive strategy being voiced by the US, the UK and even Russia is

predicated on individual/collective counter proliferation competencies. The counter proliferation strategy is based on the concept of taking unilateral action to destroy the nuclear weapons capability of selected proliferate states - the entire cycle including materials, research facilities, fuel cycle infrastructure and the nuclear arsenal. The phenomenal funding effort to develop doctrines, create hardware and train the military is indicative of a threat in being that all proliferate states cannot but take seriously. However, there are serious political and military problems in the actual implementation of such a policy. Especially as it would have to be agreed to by all the other NWS.

Finally little if any attention is being paid to scientific efforts in the US (and other advanced states) to develop the next generation of nuclear weapons. If the existing data bank, advanced computational capabilities and the National Ignition Facility can provide the next generation of 'pure fusion weapons' then the US can happily reverse its position on the question of 'elimination of nuclear weapons' without compromising its position of being the premier military state and thereby guaranteeing the American security. In one fell stroke they would have generated a substantial reduction in the threat of an attack by nuclear weapons, eliminated development of nuclear technology and weapons and created an unbridgeable gap between prevailing technology and infrastructure and 'pure fusion weapons' and nuclear weapons. As and when this initiative matures we can expect Washington to press for the elimination of nuclear weapons as the next step in the arms control agenda.

At this point of time these are theoretical forays. Are they feasible considering a substantial effort and funding already flows

in this direction? States sensitive to their sovereign right to cater for their own well being must consider all options carefully - no matter how far fetched they may appear.

Conclusion

'Deterrence' is not an inanimate notion governed by a set of inflexible parameters. It has a dynamic of its own which is related to the transience in the nuclear weapons ambience within which a minimum credible deterrence would be required to be effective. This, therefore, boils down to numbers, quality and doctrine of employment. Each factor would be affected by the dynamics of the nuclear environment. While increments in the level of techno-civilisational status may lead to a reduction in numbers to deter an adversary, technical alterations and doctrinal evolution could require major qualitative changes. For example China's efforts to make its strategic posture capable of retaining its deterrence value in a missile defence environment. For a nascent nuclear weapon state like India, dependent on limited nuclear tests and marginal data, qualitative modifications of the force structure may become inescapable to ensure it retains minimum credible deterrence posture. This may require validation or increments in numbers.

While the advertised role of the global arms control strategies is to make the world a safer place, the undercurrent is directed to creating commitments and internationally applicable legal restrictions to complement the technology restrictive regimes in place so that the US (and by extension Western) power potential gives it a unique capability to control the international milieu without restriction. But what is often missed is the aspirations of the other nations to build a secure environment

to allow them to be part of the international scene in their own sovereign right.

When policy makers and analysts in the US and the other NWS study the actions and reactions of India to the prevailing Arms Control Regime, they would do well to analyse the subject through the prism from which Indian policy makers see these developments. Unfortunately, most of the research on the subject emanating from the American continent appears to be bound to the singular US national interest and fails to take into account the concerns of the target state.

In the recent past intellectuals in the US have begun to recognise India's true concerns. But by limiting this exercise to identifying India's concerns without an honest

appraisal of what policy makers in India could and would do to address those concerns in the perspective of India's national interests, leaves us at square one - talking at each other and not with each other.

Finally if the Arms Control Regime is threatened by anarchy - the authors of the regime must accept that neither the objective nor the means can stand the test of integrity. The linkages of the current phase of nuclear arms control arrangements would lie in incremental initiatives by the nuclear weapon states in the future, and require that all future contingencies are identified, appreciated and interpolated with development of current nuclear strategy. Failure to do this would result in commitments today that may effectively disadvantage India in the future.

SECOND SESSION : SECOND PAPER

MAJOR GENERAL LUO BIN (RETD)

First of all, I would like to briefly recall and highlight some major developments in international arms control and disarmament in the year 2003. Since the late 1990s of the last century, especially since the Bush administration came into power, the US arms control policies have undergone considerable changes and tend to be tougher. And the international arms control and disarmament process has remained at a low ebb and in stagnation. This was particularly the case within the UN and other multilateral arms control fora. There was no progress at all on some traditional arms control and disarmament agenda items, such as nuclear disarmament, prevention of an arms race in outer space (PAROS). On some issues, there was even retrogression.

In my view, the tendencies noticed in the year 2003 as given in the succeeding paragraphs deserve attention.

At the end of 2002, the National Security Council released an official document entitled *National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction*. Last May, President Bush announced the formation of another US-led "coalition of the willing" consisting of 11 countries (now 15) called the "Proliferation Security Initiative". The participating states agree to share information and intelligence and act jointly to intercept and inspect suspected weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and ballistic missiles-related items on high seas, in the international air space and/or even at some seaports. This shows that the US administration has placed an even greater emphasis on prevention and counter-proliferation of WMD in its arms control policy. Since North Korea withdrew from the NPT in

January 2003 the US-Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) relationship grew tense. In view of the North Korean nuclear issue and the Iraq War, the US was more insistent on linking anti-terrorism more closely with counter-proliferation and bashing the "rogue states", and more reliant on military force and unilateralist actions in dealing with the international security issues; rather than promoting international security and stability through dialogue, multilateral arms control negotiations and enhanced international cooperation in export control. Signs have shown that the current US administration has become less interested in multinational arms control treaties and arrangements. It concludes that such regimes and their verification measures are ineffective in containing proliferation and prevent cheating and non-compliance by certain countries. Last year, the US administration obtained approval from the Congress to lift the ban on research and development of mini-nukes (below 5000 tons yield) and nuclear bunker-busters to make them available for their use to strike targets of chemical and biological weapons or related facilities and shorten the time needed to resume nuclear tests.

In my personal opinion, the Bush administration's reinforcement of its unilateralist arms control policy is a major factor that hinders the international arms control and disarmament process.

Russia signed the Moscow Treaty with the US under which both sides agree to destroy their operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads by 2/3rd within a period of 10 years. But Russian leaders would never give up or weaken Russia's nuclear deterrent

capabilities and will continue their modernisation efforts to strengthen Russia's nuclear forces and the entire armed forces. At a meeting in October 2003 in the Russian Defence Ministry, Russia decided to readjust its own military strategy in light of the new US strategy. President Putin and Russian Defence Minister have clearly stated that Russia would reserve the right to preemptive strikes with nuclear weapons and emphasised that in the coming years, Russia would equip its forces with new strategic missiles. The Russian State Duma insists that the Putin government should closely follow the development of the US strategic nuclear forces and the research, development and deployment of missile defence systems of the US and other countries, and to spend more on the development of Russia's own nuclear forces to ensure for credible nuclear deterrent capabilities and potentials.

One can see from the above that the Moscow Treaty has not made the world safer and free from a new nuclear arms race and the spectre of the nuclear war is still hovering over mankind.

In the year 2003, the international community has further realised the importance of effectively preventing the proliferation of WMD and their delivering vehicles, and particularly guarding against terrorist organisations and terrorists getting hold of such weapons. Therefore, extensive consultations were held with more information exchanges in various multilateral export control regimes and bilaterally between many countries, sharing experiences in perfecting national legislation on export control, developing stricter regulations and measures. Here I would like to point out in particular, in recent years, the Chinese government has formulated and promulgated all-round,

integrated and strict sets of regulations, measures and export control lists with regard to dual-use nuclear, chemical and biological and missile items. At present, relevant national authoritative agencies are working out detailed implementation measures. In December 2003, the Chinese government released a new white paper on *China's Non-Proliferation Policy and Measures*. In my opinion, the best way to contain the proliferation of WMD and ballistic missiles is to strengthen international cooperation and ease regional tensions through dialogue and diplomatic talks so as to eradicate the dynamics and root causes of proliferation. With military forces as backing, interception as a counter-proliferation measure only touches the symptoms, which does not treat the ailment. If handled improperly, such actions might lead to new international conflicts and regional tensions.

In the year 2003, the North Korea nuclear issue and the Iranian nuclear programme attracted international attention as two regional nuclear issues. In the first few months of 2003, disputes over the North Korea nuclear issue were heated up and might possibly slide into a new crisis. On this issue, China played a unique role. The Chinese government and leaders made unremitting efforts to promote talks for dialogue and peaceful solution, and tried hard to bridging the gaps between the two major parties, the US and North Korea. With concerted efforts from all sides, the tripartite talks of China, the US and North Korea and the first round of six party talks were held in April 2003 and August 2003 respectively in Beijing. Although no agreement was reached and no breakthrough was made, yet the confrontation between the US and North Korea was greatly alleviated. Now, consensus has been reached for holding the second

round of six-party talks. If the US and North Korea truly have the political will for a peaceful solution, I believe that an agreement acceptable to all sides can be eventually reached.

Beginning from late October of 2003, a window of opportunity was opened on the Iranian nuclear issue. Under the mediation of the foreign ministers of France, the UK and Germany, (Russia might have used its influence with Iran) the Iranian government recently signed the additional safeguards protocol with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Iran has agreed that IAEA can conduct unrestrained inspections and verifications on the Iranian nuclear installations, and announced a moratorium on its enriched uranium production. Meanwhile, France, the UK and Germany, promised to provide technical assistance to Iran's peaceful use of nuclear energy. Whether this issue could continue to move in positive direction this year depends on the earnest implementation of the agreement by the parties concerned and on cooperation between Iran and the IAEA. This will be conducive to set in motion the normalisation process between the US and Iran and to regional stability.

In the process of international arms control and non-proliferation, there emerged an unexpected positive development by the end of 2003. Just before the Christmas, the Libyan leader M Gaddafi announced that Libya would completely abandon its WMD programme. Shortly afterwards, an IAEA team was invited to Libya to inspect and verify. It was reported that this is the result of nine-months secret diplomatic talks between Libya and the West. What are the reasons for Libya to have made such an important decision remains to be analysed and observed.

However, the significance of this lies in that it serves to show that through diplomatic and political channels, dialogue, consultation, and talks among the countries concerned can effectively promote the international non-proliferation, which is in the interest of all parties, while pressures, sanctions, interceptions or use of force will be counter-productive, with negative consequences without achieving intended objectives.

Last but not the least, non-governmental organisations (NGOs) have grown stronger in 2003, playing a more proactive noteworthy role in the field of arms control and disarmament. According to the United Nations (UN) statistics, the number of NGOs that have obtained the consultative status from the UN Economic and Social Council had increased from 2234 to 2379 in the year 2003. These NGOs are more active than in the past in safeguarding peace and advancing the arms control and disarmament processes. In early 2003 the most striking example is the large scale demonstrations took place in more than 600 cities all over the world with over 10 million demonstrators in opposing the US armed attack on Iraq. Many demonstrations broke out in the US and in the countries that supported the US for the war. With the disarmament negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament (CD) in Geneva being at a standstill, the NGOs of various countries and international NGOs held meetings of different kinds, strongly criticising the unilateralist policies of the Bush administration and produced in-depth studies of arms control and disarmament issues. They called for preserving the international arms control and disarmament regimes and urged the UN to renew its important role in this field. I think, the NGOs, including both our institutions, the USI and the China Arms Control and Disarmament Association (CACDA), need to

increase exchanges and cooperation in the new year of 2004 so as to better influence the government policy making and help promote the international arms control and disarmament process.

In my short presentation, perhaps I have not addressed all important arms control and disarmament issues. I look forward to benefiting from valuable views from our Indian friends and my Chinese colleagues in the discussion.

DISCUSSANTS

Lieutenant General P K Pahwa, PVSM (Retd)

The infirmities of the various treaties designed to limit proliferation have been well brought out during the presentations of papers. There is no doubt that these treaties are one-sided and unequal. Restrictions have been placed on the have-nots while there are no corresponding binding obligations on the haves. They permit vertical proliferation while freezing horizontal proliferation. The driving force behind these treaties is the US determination to remain the world's number one military power and leader in technology. This has served to distort the various export control regimes as well. The superpowers have obviously no intention of disarming as they are continuing research into areas like low yield nuclear weapons and pure fusion weapons.

In view of the developments around the world in the last five years, and particularly after 11 September 2001 it appears that the various non-proliferation treaties, those in force as well as others still to come into force or are being negotiated, are no longer as important as they were. In the last five years the international environment has changed to such an extent that there does not now appear to be any country that is likely to want to go nuclear in the foreseeable future. The situation today is as follows:-

- (a) Two out of the three erstwhile threshold nuclear powers, India and Pakistan, have already gone nuclear. The third one, Israel, is known to have nuclear weapons.
- (b) Of the three countries that comprised President Bush's 'axis of evil', Iraq is under the US occupation.

Whatever be the problems there, the danger of its acquiring WMDs is not one of them. Iran's secret uranium enrichment programme has been exposed and it has agreed to suspend it and accept closer IAEA inspections. North Korea, has already declared that it has nuclear weapons and has walked out of the NPT.

(c) Libya, recently acknowledged that it had a rudimentary nuclear weapons programme. The programme has now been abandoned and Libya has opened its facilities for inspection by the IAEA.

(d) The Taliban government has been ousted from Afghanistan and the US troops are operating there. The Americans have also established military bases in at least three of the five Central Asian Republics.

Thus, with the threshold states having acquired nuclear weapons and most of the other states of concern having been neutralised in one way or the other, there is hardly any country on the horizon that could go nuclear in the near future. The proposed US, UK and French strategy of launching pre-emptive nuclear strikes against any non-nuclear weapons state that is party to the NPT trying to develop WMDs is a further deterrent. The only possibility I see is that of Japan and South Korea walking out of the NPT and starting a nuclear weapons programme if North Korea cannot be persuaded to give up its nuclear weapons. This contingency, however, appears remote. Acquiring nuclear weapons appears to be only a tactical move by North Korea, and if past experience is any guide, a deal will be struck in which it will ultimately agree to renounce

its nuclear ambitions in return for some concessions. As far as Taiwan is concerned, I do not think it will take the risk of going nuclear, as this would evoke a very strong Chinese reaction.

The other states of concern could be Syria, Saudi Arabia and Sudan. But it appears unlikely that they would try and acquire nuclear weapons. Syria is already under pressure from the Americans. They are planning to impose sanctions on it for allegedly sheltering Palestinian and other terrorists. Saudi Arabia, the one time close friend of the US, is now in the doghouse. It is trying hard to brush off the charge of being a breeding ground for terrorists. Sudan has been under the scanner since 1998 after the terrorist attacks on the US embassies in Tanzania and Kenya.

The point being made is that treaties like the NPT, the CTBT and the FMCT that are being negotiated or have yet to come into force, are embedded in the past and are not quite important today. There is little danger of further proliferation. This, however, does not mean that we can do away altogether with international control regimes. They continue to be relevant because the threat of proliferation by states has now been replaced by the shadowy threat of acquisition of WMD, by non-state actors such as terrorists. Terrorism is seen to be the main threat to the international order. Terrorist groups are not just states within states but constitute a world within the world because of their seamless international linkages. They have shown that they have the capability and the patience to conceive, plan and execute complex operations. These plans could include acquisition of some nuclear capability.

The international control regimes, both arms control and export control, therefore,

need to shift focus from the present denial of technology and WMD-related items to certain states based on an outdated criteria, to denying them to terrorist groups. It is difficult to regulate export of items and technologies in this era of globalisation, more so when a large number of private commercial organisations are also involved in Research and Development (R and D). There are at present far too many technologies and items on the banned list. These need to be reduced and restricted to only those that are likely to be of interest to terrorist groups. Similarly, the existing control regimes target too many countries. Only those countries through which there is a possibility of terrorist groups acquiring sensitive items and technologies should be on the denial list. There is also need for a consensus among the suppliers on the countries and items to be placed on the denial list. Some of the countries currently targeted need to be actually taken on board as part of the control regimes. Only if the list of banned items and technologies is small and specific, and the number of targeted countries few, will it be possible to exercise proper export control. If they continue to be as large and whimsical as they are today, then the terrorists will manage to get what they want.

It is now confirmed that some Pakistani nuclear scientists had helped North Korea, Iran and Libya start their nuclear weapon programmes. Keeping an eye on the movements and activities of scientists who have worked in nuclear, chemical or biological laboratories is, therefore, also an essential requirement to stop proliferation.

Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI).

A few countries have joined it even though it is in violation of international law. PSI can be fully effective only if all the countries join it. That is unlikely to happen unless the UN is

brought into it. The US, therefore, needs to obtain the authorisation of the UN otherwise it will be difficult to intercept forbidden merchandise.

For this the criteria should be spelt out. The number of targeted countries needs to be reduced and some of the countries currently on the denial list need to be taken on board. The reason why these regimes have failed in the past is that there are far too many items and technologies on the banned list and not all the supplier countries agree with them.

Professor Ye Ru'an

I mentioned to Brigadier VK Nair that we need three days to discuss the subject of 'arms control and disarmament' as the subject has become very complicated today as compared to what it was several years ago.

The two speakers described the current international arms control and non-proliferation regime. I find considerable common views and ground. This is particularly so as regards the PSI and non proliferation. The issue of international arms control and disarmament has been discussed during three special UN Sessions during the decade from 1978 to 1988. The Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT) review conference in the year 2000 formulated 13 practical steps in its final document.

The current international disarmament situation is very disappointing for most of the countries including China and India. As a matter of fact, the existing international arms control and disarmament regimes are the product of most of the bilateral US-Soviet negotiations and bilateral treaties on nuclear weapons. Gradually, more and more countries got including China involved. China became

more active since late 1970s and early 1980s in international arms control. There were positive developments in the late 1980s and the first part of 1990s. The two nuclear super powers reached agreements on 'Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate-Range and Shorter Range Missiles' (INF Treaty) and the 'Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty' (START). In Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) developments were positive. The current situation is attributable to change in arms control policies of the US regime. There are more changes than continuity on the question of national security. The Clinton administration was very active and the first to sign the CTBT which the Senate rejected. The Bush administration just wants to cast it away and would not put it up to the Senate for ratification.

The current US administration also walked out of the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) protocol, which was a result of more than six years of negotiations. As Brigadier VK Nair has mentioned, the US now has programmes for developing new military strategic nuclear capabilities like mini-nukes, deep bunker busters, reducing the preparation for resuming nuclear tests, backsliding in negative security assurances to non nuclear states and so on. The current US administration approaches the international regimes on a selective and discretionary basis. The US officials do not say that all international treaties are irrelevant. They are still committed to the NPT, CWC etc. But in the words of under Secretary John Bolton who said a year ago that, "in arms control issues, whatever is in the way of promoting US interests, we will not abide by the relevant treaty." So they want to stick to those international agreements which are in keeping with the US interests alone.

To solve disarmament issues, one country or a group of countries would not be effective in controlling the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and eliminating nuclear weapons. International cooperation is imperative for elimination of nuclear weapons. Another point that we should draw a distinction between the two nuclear superpowers and smaller nuclear countries like China, Britain and France. China follows a deterrence strategy. China announced that its nuclear arsenal is small and it would never be the first to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against any other country. This has been proved in the past four decades. If you look at the US National Nuclear Strategy, she wants to maintain superpower position for an overwhelming nuclear arsenal. China is only for keeping the nuclear force for survival.

Talking about modernisation, and measures and counter measures for missile defence, American officials and scholars have asked Chinese scholars as to what would China do to counter the US missile defence? Would it build up its nuclear arsenal? The official Chinese stand is that she will take

limited action to keep nuclear forces operational. So China would not resort to an arms race with the USA. We should draw lessons from the super power rivalry and the history of the arms race. China neither has the intention nor the capability to enter into an arms race.

The global military expenditure has increased during recent years. Majority of countries spend increased budget on strengthening their defence capabilities. In view of the military and technological revolution, it is legitimate for all countries to strengthen their defence capabilities. Of course, different countries have different means and different security environments and challenges to cope up with.

As regards the current situation, I think we need to persuade the Americans to realise that the existing international arms control, non proliferation regimes and the international community have a shared goal to prevent the spread of the WMD. This is both in the national interests of the countries and for peace and stability in various regions and the entire universe.

GENERAL DISCUSSION

Lieutenant General BS Malik, PVSM, AVSM (Retd)

My question is for Major General Luo Bin. He made a very interesting argument of link of proliferation with regional tension. That is precisely the reason why proliferation took place in the first place and some countries passed on nuclear technologies to Pakistan. The second thing I would like to know is that China is taking actions for the future. But one knows from the knowledge of technology that whosoever has got the technology requires some kind of help to sustain it. Is China going to take measures to ensure that help is not given?

Lieutenant General YM Bammi (Retd)

May I request you to give us the views of China on the Proliferation Security Initiatives (PSI)? Has China denounced it or do you think it is an extension of the pre-emption policy of the United States now being taken over to the high seas?

Shri SK Behl

Once again it is Russia and the USA which are slowly edging to an arms race. This is also applicable to the Anti Ballistic Missile (ABM) treaty. China does not consider itself as a competitor in the missile defence. We are both developing countries and could we take some concerted action or have some sort of co-operation between the two countries on this front to impress upon superpower for arms control and total disarmament. I have been following the Chinese nuclear policy for a long time. China has insisted that total nuclear disarmament is not being talked about. We are talking only about arms control.

The second point is that, there is every likelihood of these weapons falling into the

hands of the terrorist organisations. Could China also take part in controlling this.

Mr Ye Ru'an

As General Luo Bin (Retd) mentioned the Chinese government had released a white paper on the Chinese position on non-proliferation last December. The Chinese position on non-proliferation policies and regulations is fairly comprehensive. These are serious Chinese policies not just for public relations or propaganda. I have noticed that the Chinese government has formulated binding regulations governing the prohibition and control of a few items and areas of weapons of mass destruction such as nuclear, chemical, biological weapons including missiles. I made a comparison between the control list of China's regulation of missile non-proliferation with those control list of the MTCR. More than half of the items are the same in the two lists. We are having more restrictions on export items than the MTCR list. The concerned agencies in China like the commerce department or the customs office are co-operating in working out specific measures on how to implement these regulations including licencing and the penalty on the exporters.

If you look at the Foreign Minister's Chinese website, the spokesman mentioned that the PSI has raised wide-spread universal concern on the counter-proliferation issue including legal matters. The Chinese policy on measures concerning proliferation, non-proliferation or counter-proliferation is that first it should be under the UN auspices. Second it needs to be progressed through political and diplomatic means rather than military interception etc. Emphasis should be on international co-operation. I learnt from my

colleagues in China who went to the United States that the Americans have been impressing that the United States Government would make these principles for interdiction etc. as an international law. They want the other countries should abide by them. This is extremely unilateral. Unilateral interdictions by just a few countries of course, would raise the legitimacy of these measures in international law. Although there are fifteen countries participating for various reasons, I agree with Brigadier VK Nair that this is a unilateral action. It would raise many serious and complex issues if put into operation.

As regards the ABM treaty, before the US withdrew; China's view was that although it was a bilateral treaty between the United States and former Soviet Union, which is Russia now, it is a treaty which concerns the security of all countries in the world. Because this treaty formed the foundation for international strategic stability and had a balance of mutual deterrence between two super powers. So without this treaty the Americans will deploy the NMD or TMD which would strengthen their offensive capabilities. It is not merely a defensive measure. If a nuclear exchange takes place, it is not only a matter of America and Russia as we do not know where the nuclear war would break out. So the Chinese position is that it would destabilise strategic security situation in the world.

Lieutenant General Satish Nambiar, PVSM, AVSM, Vrc (Retd)

I have a question which Brigadier VK Nair may wish to answer and also my Chinese friends if they so desire. It is related to technology control regimes. Though we have been a victim of it for years, we are not signatories to the NPT and other regimes,

yet we have adhered to the provisions of these regimes very faithfully.

The situation today is that the CTBT is a dead horse. Things probably will become worse if the Americans go ahead with whatever they are thinking of. If that is so, I do not think there is any future for the FMCT. What then is the way out? Will it collapse? Or is there a hope of its revival? What form will the resuscitation take? Is anyone serious about it? I am not an expert on the subject, but looking at it as a security analyst, I find that it just does not seem to fall into place.

Brigadier VK Nair, VSM (Retd)

This issue has been debated in the year 2000 in the 'US think tanks' and Institutes like the RAND. They were of the view that in so far as the pre-election thinking of President Bush was concerned, they would declare NPT as redundant. They felt that there is no control left on being able to stop this technology from shifting to forms of weapons with non state players. So they had already visualised it.

They then talked in terms of a "breakaway strategy". They said that the United States must create capacities way out of reach of China, Russia and the European nations. The technology gap must be so much that in no way they can reach without collapse. They felt, that would make sure that others like Saudi Arabia, Libya, India, Pakistan would not be able to catch up and would roll back. They genuinely believe that this is going to happen.

They ordered various studies and it is very interesting to note that there is a total collapse of confidence within the US system regarding their ability to deter anybody. That is why they are looking at the fusion weapons. Because the NPT has collapsed and the

reasons they give for collapse amongst others is that there are no longer five nuclear weapon states but eight. Therefore, this treaty was redundant. They were not ready to go to Article VI, which is disarmament. Therefore, the only answer is the "breakaway strategy". But they know that it is not attainable at the moment. They cannot say it — that the NPT is dead and they need to create defensive measures and not offensive ones. China has no problem with the NMD, but has serious problems with the TMD, because the TMD is going to be deployed in the Asia Pacific region.

If they deploy NMD, how does it effect their deterrence? My own view is that, it does not effect the deterrence because the USA is too vast.

The MTCR will survive now but how far will it survive when there are so many break-out states from it? We can see the figures from the day we brought the MTCR into place and the number of states who have got 2000 km plus capability today. Who is being threatened? Saudi Arabia did not take missiles to threaten China, Russia or the USA. But they are being perceived as a threat by others in the area. I, therefore, agree with the Americans that this is going to collapse in its present avatar.

Major General YK Gera (Retd)

In your opinion what is the essential difference between a pure fusion weapon and a nuclear weapon? Will they be the weapons of mass destruction (WMD) or not? Because if they are, then how can they take a somersault and say ok, scrap that and now we have this technology which others cannot achieve. But what is the end product? The end product is that still they can cause mass destruction, and if that be so, then how can they get away with it?

Brigadier VK Nair, VSM (Retd)

They claim that pure fusion can give them a form of precision and reduce collateral damage to a manageable degree. So can they get the other nuclear weapons states to buy that argument? That is the other question. But with that weapon they assume that they will be able to cope with. China, France and the UK have got limited nuclear weapons. Possibly they can deal with that. But when it comes to the equation of the USA and a weakened Russia — it will not work. Because nuclear capability is one thing that Russia has maintained to a credible level.

Mr Ye Ru'an

As regards the fusion weapon, I am not a nuclear scientist. In the nuclear posture review I find that they would keep the state-of-the-art strategic weapons and extend the capabilities of the triad until 2040.

Multilateral Control Regimes. If we read the related chapter in the Stockholms International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) *Year Book 2002* and the translated version of 2003, the last chapter describes in detail, about the consultations and discussions within these multilateral control regimes — the MTCR, Australia Group and Nuclear Supplier Group etc. It was noted that great efforts need to be put in to work out ways and means of preventing the proliferation of WMD and dual use by non-state actors in addition to the proliferating countries.

China is a member of Zangger Committee. We are making efforts to have more exchanges and discussions with other groups on how to improve control measures; because we do share the objectives to prevent it. I think as far as the international community, the 11 September 2001 incident

makes countries to think about the possibility of terrorists getting hold of the WMD. Of course, for nuclear weapons it is far more difficult than the chemical or the biological weapons.

Major General Leo Bin (Retd)

I have two figures as regards disarmament, viz :-

(a) The military expenditure of China in 2003 was 22.6 billion US dollars. That is 1.6 per cent of its GDP, which is equivalent to 40 per cent of the Japanese, 50 per cent of France, 60 per cent of the UK and 6 per cent of the US military expenditures.

(b) Another figure which the Central Government of China has announced is that before 2005 another 200,000 troops would be demobilised.

These two figures have demonstrated the spirit of our defence i.e. our national defence is for self defence. We will not commit aggression or expand and will never get in an arms race.

Economic and social development in China is a priority area under the leadership of the Central Government. Although we have made progress, our achievement has not been spectacular and our per capita income in 2003 was less than US \$ 1000.

China-Pak Relationship. China and Pakistan have maintained friendly and good relations in the past. The Armed Forces of China and Pakistan also maintain good relationship. We also had good co-operation in military industry. We had co-operated in producing K-8 fighter trainer. China-Pakistan friendship is defined in a normal state-to-state

relationship. The Chinese Government is strictly abiding by promises in all its relations.

We are also very pleased to say that China-India relationship is also improving. We sincerely hope that China-India relationship and China-Pakistan relationship will continue to improve and go together. That is in accordance with the Chinese government's good neighbourly policy to take the neighbours as companions and develop together with the neighbours. I would like to stress that our leaders, Armed Forces and the common people including our scholars, sincerely hope for good relationship with India.

Example of North Korea. We had traditional friendship with North Korea. In the past decade, we also developed good relationship with South Korea in political, economic, military and diplomatic affairs.

Chairman's Remarks

We have covered a wide range of issues – the NPT, CTBT, FMCT, PSI and all those acronyms, and jargons in the arms control regimes. We have different views and interpretations. We pointed out certain weaknesses, ineffectiveness and indiscriminate nature of the NPT treaty. Some speakers also pointed out the usefulness and achievements of the NPT. So there are different views and we all find that now the NPT is leading towards unilateral counter proliferation. Unilateral counter proliferation is in violation of international laws and norms and is dangerous.

We all discussed the Chinese position on the non-proliferation and the Chinese colleagues mentioned the consistent stand of China about nuclear free zones in the Korean Peninsula, South East Asia and South Asia. We think this is conducive to peace

and stability of Asia and the world and also in the interest of all countries in this region.

Indian people have other concerns and in certain cases different views on these questions; which has drawn the attention of the Chinese scholars.

The joint declaration of our two countries and two governments mentions that, "we share lot of common ground on nuclear disarmament and elimination of nuclear

weapons. We are firmly opposed to introduction of weapons in outer space, use of force against space-based objects and support co-operation in development of space technology for peaceful purposes".

So, despite different opinions on some issues, there are common areas where the Chinese and the Indian scholars can work together. We find that common ground outweighs our differing views.

THE FUTURE OF THE UNITED NATIONS

THIRD SESSION

Chairman : Shri CR Gharekhan, IFS (Retd)

First Paper : Mr Zheng Ruixiang

Second Paper : Lieutenant General Satish Nambiar, PVSM, AVSM, VrC (Retd)

Third Paper : Dr C Raja Mohan

Discussants : Air Marshal Vir Narain, PVSM (Retd)

Ambassador Li Daoyu

THIRD SESSION : FIRST PAPER

MR ZHENG RUIXIANG

Current World Situation

With economic globalisation relations between countries are getting closer, and national interests intertwined. To meet the global challenges collectively by enhancing coordination and cooperation appears to be the thrust of the international community. Currently the world community is faced with following four challenges:-

- (a) Non-conventional threats, such as terrorism, disease, drug trafficking, have never been so critical, and they are interwoven with conventional threats, jeopardising peace, security and safety of mankind.
- (b) The unilateralist behaviour by some countries.
- (c) The undermined authority and role of the UN after the Iraq war.
- (d) The economic globalisation has made the international development further imbalanced and the South-North gap wider.

Multilateralism

The war on Iraq has caused profound changes in the international situation and eroded the authority of the United Nations (UN). There is a need to strengthen the role of the UN and adopt multilateralism. The core of multilateralism rests on two pillars. The first is democratisation of international relations, and the second is that international relations should be based on international laws and other commonly recognised international norms. In my opinion, to uphold multilateralism, we should focus on four

issues as discussed in succeeding paragraphs.

Firstly, the interests of the part and the whole should be coordinated. The concept of common security and common prosperity should be the common goal. We should oppose actions that seek security and development at the expense of others.

Secondly, the rights and the obligations should be balanced. Member states should benefit from international cooperation, and at the same time should fulfill the international obligations.

Thirdly, democracy and the rule of international laws or norms should be combined when dealing with international issues. Each country should have an equal say in international issues. To rule the world with international laws and commonly recognised international norms, especially the establishment of a fair and reasonable new international order, is important.

Fourthly, the UN's role should be recognised and supported. Like India, China also supports multilateralism and the role of the UN.

The Role of the UN

During the past 60 years since it was founded, the UN has experienced successes and failures. All in all it has made great contributions to the pursuit of peace and development of mankind. We now live in an intertwined and interdependent world, where common interests and common challenges to different countries are ever increasing. Peace, stability, development and prosperity can only be realised through cooperation and dialogue on an equal footing.

Without the UN, no major issues in the world can be resolved. First, the UN is the most universal, authoritative and representative international organisation in the world; second, the UN Charter serves as the guide for dealing with international relations; third, the UN Security Council is the sole organisation that is entitled to represent all its member states on issues of peace and security. The role of the UN, which no other international organisation can play, is an important basis and guarantee in international cooperation.

India is a developing country, and so is China. The UN has in its history been an important arena where developing countries strive for national determination and safeguard political independence. With the development of economic globalisation, the UN should also become the arena where the developing countries participate in global management, promote democracy in international relations, and protect their common interests. In this respect, to further strengthen the role of the UN is a matter of urgency and great importance.

There are two key factors contributing to building the UN stronger: first, the political will of and actions taken by member states to support the UN to play a central role in international affairs, and second, the UN itself should make progress with the times through necessary and reasonable reforms.

The UN Reforms

There has been a louder voice for reforms of the UN after the Iraq War, as reflected in the 58th session of the UN General Assembly. Recently, a high level panel of eminent personalities has been set up by the Secretary General Kofi Annan, of which both Lieutenant General Satish Nambiar and Mr.

Qian Qichen are members. I believe this panel will help promote the process of UN reforms.

I have some personal opinions about the issue of UN reform. Firstly, the purpose of the reforms is to enhance its capability to deal with new threats and new challenges, especially the capability to manage economic globalisation. Secondly, the principle of reforms should be democracy, transparency, and accommodating different interests, especially those of the developing countries. Thirdly, attention should be paid to different areas of reform. For the developing countries, it is equally important to enhance UN's role in the field of development. Fourthly, to reform is not to discard everything. Instead, there are some good traditions and practices that we should stick to, especially the purposes and principles of the UN Charter.

The reform of the Security Council is the key to the UN reforms. It involves two aspects. One is expansion, and the other is working methods. The former is currently in a deadlock, while the latter has experienced noteworthy progress, of which one example is the establishment of consultation mechanism between the Security Council and the contributor countries. China is of the view that we should correct the imbalance in the composition of the Security Council through reforms, and uphold the principle of equitable geographical distribution, and increase in the representation of developing countries. Any plan that ostracises or discriminates against the developing countries is unacceptable.

Since the UN does its job in accordance with the common will of all member states, it depends on the political willingness of its member states to carry out its work successfully. Therefore, member states should blame themselves when it cannot do it successfully. Making the UN as a scapegoat

is neither justified, nor in the interests of the international community.

Conflict Prevention

"Prevention is preferable to cure". Conflict prevention is one of the important jobs of the UN. It may sometimes seem to be difficult, time-consuming and at a high cost. However, compared with the damages caused by conflict and war, conflict prevention has significant functions. More than two years ago, Secretary General Kofi Annan put forward the Ten Principals of Conflict Prevention, creatively putting forward the idea of moving the UN from a culture of reaction to a culture of prevention. In the year 2002, the 57th session of the UN General Assembly adopted the resolution on the prevention of armed conflict by consensus. It should be a key aspect in the process of the UN reforms to strengthen the capacity of the UN to prevent conflicts. I would like to share the following views:-

- (a) Efforts in conflict prevention must be in conformity with the purposes and principles of the UN Charter and other universally recognised norms, including the principle of "with consent of the parties concerned".
- (b) Conflict prevention should be conducted mainly in accordance with Chapter VI of the UN Charter.
- (c) Conflicts have their complex root causes. Therefore a conflict prevention strategy should not be simplified, and different measures should be adopted for different regions, different countries and different circumstances.
- (d) The emphasis of conflict prevention should be placed on dealing with the economic, social, cultural,

political and other structural reasons, particularly the issue of development.

- (e) In order to achieve the best result, conflict prevention should be conducted as early as possible.
- (f) With regard to use of coercive measures such as sanctions, there are different views. Consensus is not easy to achieve in a short term. I think this question can be left to the Security Council. Let the Security Council make judgments and decisions in view of different cases.

Humanitarian Intervention

In the era of globalisation, the impact of humanitarian crisis in a given country or region can easily spill over beyond its boundary and become a threat to international and regional peace and security. The international community has a concern to alleviate and stop such crises, which call for actions for intervention.

However, intervention by the international community should be conducted in a prudent and responsible way. Otherwise, we can only get the exactly opposite results. My views are as under:-

- (a) Humanitarian intervention does not mean the abolishment of the principles of sovereignty and non-interference in the internal affairs. Intervention should have the support and cooperation of the local people and get the consent of the government or parties concerned.
- (b) Intervention should be based on reliable evidence and be conducted by peaceful means through political and diplomatic measures.
- (c) In order to ensure the full

legitimacy and validity, humanitarian intervention should be conducted within the UN framework and be authorised, supervised and guided by the Security Council.

The Issue of Development

Economic globalisation for various reasons is leading to marginalisation of developing countries day by day. The gap between the South and the North is widening, and the situation is worsening. How to realise common development and make globalisation a blessing to the people all over the world, relates to the question of how to take a strategic view of this issue. In the 1990s, the international community discussed the negative impact of globalisation, but more from the perspective of obligations and virtues. The events of 11 September 2001 gave a wake-up call regarding rise of the non-traditional security threats, such as poverty and development. We have to deal with and solve the problem of uneven development in the interest of international peace and security.

What worries most is that the role of the UN on the aspect of international economic development has been weakening. Only if the UN plays an important role in the world economic order, can we solve the issue of development, making the economic globalisation a positive force for all in the

world. Not only should the UN establish a "preventive culture", but also a "development culture". The views that I cherish most are as under:-

(a) The UN should continue to push the developed countries to lay emphasis on development, fulfill their commitments, and support the UN from the perspectives of politics, moral principles and obligations.

(b) The UN has established an interactive relationship with the three global economic institutions such as the World Trade Organisation, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. The UN should make good use of them and influence multilateral trade and financial issues positively.

(c) The UN should attach importance to the new round of multilateral trade negotiations.

(d) The UN should take effective and concrete measures to implement the New Millennium Development Goal. It is necessary to establish a reasonable and fair frame for this purpose.

(e) The concept of all-round development of people and synchronised development between economy and society should be proposed in the UN framework.

THIRD SESSION : SECOND PAPER**LIEUTENANT GENERAL SATISH NAMBIAR, PVSM, AVSM, Vrc (RETD)**

I shall greatly appreciate your thoughts and ideas that might help in the deliberations of the 'Blue Ribbon' panel of the United Nations (UN) of which I have the privilege of being a part. At the outset, it might be useful to go through the origins and purpose of the UN. The UN was created with the following in view:-

- (a) To save succeeding generations from the scourge of war. The central purpose of the UN Charter was maintenance of international peace and security.
- (b) To reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women, and of nations large and small.
- (c) To establish conditions under which justice and respect for the obligations arising from treaties and other sources of international law can be maintained.
- (d) To promote social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom.

There are certain provisions on which this formulation was made. These are as under:-

- (a) Principle of sovereign equality.
- (b) All members fulfil obligations in good faith.
- (c) Settle disputes by peaceful means. Refrain from threat of use of force.
- (d) Provide assistance to the UN in undertaking action.

- (e) No authority to intervene in domestic matters of any state.

Most of these premises have been violated at one time or the other since the founding of the UN. The principle of sovereign equality has been compromised many times. The fact that all members must fulfill obligations in good faith has not always been so. The need to settle disputes by peaceful means and refrain from the threat of use of force is another premise which has floundered on the rock of expediency, quite often. Most of the nations make a lot of noise about providing assistance to the UN, but do not always give the UN the means to do what they are asked to undertake. Then, the UN also has no authority to intervene in domestic matters of any state. These are some of the important issues, which we need to consider - the need to move forward and whether the UN would continue to have relevance.

To fulfill these requirements, and the purpose of the Charter, the UN has :-

- (a) A General Assembly, which today has 191 members. The last nation to join was Switzerland.
- (b) A Security Council, which has the fundamental responsibility for maintenance of international peace and security.
- (c) An Economic and Social Council.
- (d) A Trusteeship Council.
- (e) An International Court of Justice.
- (f) A Secretariat.

Security Council

The composition of the Council today, in terms of permanent membership, reflects the situation as it was at the end of World War II. The countries that are permanent members were the major participants of World War II. All were not necessarily victors. The primary responsibility of the Security Council is to maintain international peace and security. It also has the responsibility for formulation of plans for the establishment of systems for regulation of armaments. The veto power rests with the five permanent members, the P5 – the US, Russia, the UK, France and the People's Republic of China.

Peacekeeping

Peacekeeping is a very important component of maintenance of international peace and security. However, there are a few points that need emphasis: -

(a) There is no provision for "Peacekeeping" in the UN Charter. A lot of people refer to it in terms of provisions of Chapter VI. It is something that was evolved by the UN Secretariat almost by accident. It was brought into use for the first time in 1948. It was initiated with the use of unarmed military observers in certain situations. Even today, in a situation where armed military contingents are deployed, there is considerable use of unarmed military observers. This is a technique and type of activity which has produced tremendous results over the years. In my view, even this needs some review.

(b) Peacekeeping is a unique art. It calls for the use of the military not to fight but to prevent fighting between belligerents through means like monitoring cease-fires or interposing

themselves between two belligerents. I say with some pride that the Indian Armed Forces have over the years proved their capability in this. Our contribution in this regard is recognised. It is an activity which "creates the space within which peacemaking is to be effected." The whole idea is that a cease-fire is to be enforced and implemented and the peacekeeping forces must create the conditions of tranquility or peace in that area of conflict within which the diplomatic processes can take place. This is what peacemaking is all about.

(c) One important thing to remember, and which is often forgotten in today's context, is the fact that peacekeeping was based on a triad of principles which merit mention as peacekeeping has been under severe strain since the 1990. Peacekeeping forces are inserted in an area of internal conflict and entails:-

- (i) Consent of the parties to the conflict.
- (ii) Impartiality.
- (iii) Minimum use of force, and that too only in self-defence.

(d) Peacekeeping is one of the most visible forms of the UN activity. It has brought the UN a lot of credit over the years, culminating in 1988 with award of the Nobel Peace Prize. That was a landmark event. This was at a time when some of the other activities of the UN were drawing flak.

Enforcement Action

The enforcement action has been mentioned, as it is important to note that Chapter VII of the UN Charter authorises the

use of force when sanctioned by the Security Council. In some ways, it started off with the conflict in Korea in 1950. The basic point that one needs to remember here is that under the provisions of the Charter, as it was then visualised, the P5 were required to provide the forces for undertaking enforcement action. This was in recognition of the fact that the P5 were capable of and had the wherewithal to provide such forces. Ironically, none of this came to fruition because the recommendations of the Military Staff Committee, which was also provided for in Chapter VII of the UN Charter on how the contributions were to be managed, could not be implemented due to the stand-off between the Western bloc and the Soviet bloc. This, in some way, is at the root of the problems that the UN faces today in terms of putting together forces to undertake action under Chapter VII. Because of this serious lacuna, it is all very ad hoc at the moment.

The UN can rightly claim credit for the following achievements over the years :-

- (a) Assisting in decolonisation.
- (b) Awareness of human security.
- (c) Promotion of some degree of democracy.
- (d) Efforts at control and reduction of nuclear arms and production of chemical weapons.
- (e) Dedicated work of agencies like the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR), the United Nations Children's Education Fund (UNICEF), the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the World Health Organisation (WHO), and so on.
- (f) Peace Keeping Operations (PKO) in many parts of the globe despite the Cold War constraints.

It assisted in many ways in decolonisation in the processes within the UN and outside; creating awareness of human security, which has become a very major aspect and rightly so. The record is rather mixed in case of promotion of some degree of democracy. Because, the not-so-democratic countries also have a very significant role in the UN; and it is part of the make up of the UN, which has to be accepted. The UN can claim credit for initiating measures to control and reduce nuclear arms and the production of chemical weapons. Whether these have been successful or not is an entirely different matter. The dedicated work of agencies like the UNHCR, UNICEF, UNDP, WHO and so on do not always come to the forefront as they are taken for granted. But these are very significant activities of the UN and these agencies have a proven expertise which needs to be recognised. Finally, there are the PKO in many parts of the globe despite constraints over the years.

The UN Secretariat

The UN Secretariat is somehow extremely bureaucratic and wasteful. So when the Americans criticise it for being wasteful, let us not bluff ourselves. I have seen it for myself. It has a very poor work culture. It has no accountability. Once a person is there, and as long as he does not do something very silly, he will continue and live to earn a sizable pension.

Perception of New World Order

Post Cold War, the UN was perceived as being used only for the purpose of the US. This is ironic. Today we criticise the US for unilateralism, but over the years, the US has been perceived as using the UN to pursue its own ends. This is true in many cases.

It was presumed at the end of the first Gulf War that all problems had come to an end and a new world order was on its way. That is how the UN got involved in a lot of activities in the early 1990s like Yugoslavia, Somalia, Cambodia and so on. Huge operations were undertaken which the UN was not geared to handle. The perception of a new world order came crashing down within months, if not weeks of the end of the Cold War when conflict erupted in the former Soviet Union, Asia, and more particularly in Africa. The arrogance of power came to be displayed more and more at that time. The operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo were a forerunner of what is happening today. Despite Mr Ye Ruan's attempt to convince me that it was different, I am not fully convinced. Though I accept Mr Ye Ruan's point that there were some differences in what took place in Kosovo and what is taking place in Iraq. The seeds were sown particularly there. There has been a quantitative and qualitative change in the scope and content of the UN peacekeeping operations because of the type of operations now being undertaken in context of internal conflicts. There are very high costs and dangers. There were always dangers. When we talk of "dangers", and I must make this point that the reason why military forces are deployed for peacekeeping is because there are dangers. If there are no dangers, there is no reason to deploy a military force. A group of policemen or non governmental organisations (NGOs) would suffice. We in the military are trained to handle danger. But there are serious problems relating to the fact that today's belligerents, the people out in the mission area, are uncontrolled mobs in many cases like paramilitaries and warlords. Therefore, they do not have that respect for the blue helmet, which earlier the regular armies had.

There are trends towards multinational regional operations. This is not necessarily a bad thing because in many cases it is required to be undertaken. But the point to note is that there must be an endorsement by the Security Council. So that there is a legitimacy provided to the operation that is undertaken.

Brahimi Panel Recommendations

The Secretary General had set up a panel under the leadership of Mr Lakhdar Brahimi, who was the special representative in Afghanistan. He has also visited the USI and has spoken here. The Brahimi Panel presented its recommendations in the year 2000. The major points that the panel made are:-

- (a) The UN cannot be everywhere. It needs to be selective. It can go, where it is capable of doing some good.
- (b) When it goes, it must go prepared to confront those who target innocent civilians, which means that it must have a capability provided for by the Security Council Resolution and by member states in provision of resources. This means the mandate and equipment must be available.
- (c) Brahimi Panel stresses that the "triad of principles" (consent of parties to the conflict, impartiality and minimum use of force only in self defence) must still remain the bedrock of peacekeeping. But the Panel recognises that this may not always be totally feasible. In certain cases it is not so much the question of violation of those principles, but in terms of the use of force, the last principle may not be totally viable, though it must be remembered for the sake of credibility.

(d) The political support of the international community has been stressed. This is one of the major shortcomings of PKO – the political commitment of those who send the peacekeeping force into the area.

(e) Review of concepts for provision of forces headquarters and heads of mission are being considered and implemented. A recommendation about a stand-by force concept has been made. This has been accepted by most countries. I have another view. I am a proponent of the fact that the UN must have a standing force. This, however, is not the view of the Government of India. This is one of the points that I intend making in the 'Blue Ribbon' panel. In a serious situation, by the time forces are put together, the situation becomes much more serious. If you have a standing force, this will not happen since the force can go in immediately after the Security Council takes a decision (the decision is of the Security Council and not the Secretary General). It has to be a Security Council decision for insertion of a standing force, whether battalion or brigade-size. It can do more good than if it goes three months later, which is generally the timeframe within which forces are put together. In three months, the situation gets out of control. Rwanda is a classic example where stand-by forces were not provided. Stand-by forces suffer from a basic drawback – the provision of forces is still the political prerogative of the countries. It is not an assured commitment. India, for example, may not want to get involved in a situation. A stand-by brigade-sized force is there, but it is not going to go because the

political decision taken is that we do not want to get involved with a particular situation. The reservation about the standing force is the cost. Of course, there would be a cost. It is no cheap business. But it will be costlier than when you start compiling the cost of later insertion of forces. This force should be comprised of volunteers from various Armies, on deputation for two to three years. They should not be on a permanent tenure as this would make the force useless. The difference here is that the volunteer serving on this force will serve in his individual capacity and not as representing his home government. In case of a casualty, the government of the country to which the volunteer belongs does not have the same degree of answerability to the masses.

(f) The importance of training has been stressed, as there have been many incidents of ill-trained troops. This has been recognised and is being addressed.

(g) Manning at the UN Headquarters and the work culture.

Situation in Context of Iraq

Unilateralism cannot be condoned. All of us who wrote and spoke about it were quite categorical about it. But that is now a matter of history. The question that needs to be addressed today is the sort of help that the international community can provide to the Iraqi people. Even the Americans have begun to realise that they need outside help and cannot do it alone. In what terms would they need the help is what needs to be addressed.

Talking about the defining moment for the UN, the Secretary General had this to say: "The past year has shaken foundations of collective security and undermined confidence in possibility of collective responses to our common problems and challenges. It has also brought to the fore deep divergences of opinion on range and nature of challenges we face and are likely to face in future."

The events of the last 12 months questioned the belief in collective response to common problems and challenges. The attack in Baghdad on the UN Headquarters in many ways indicated how the people of Iraq perceive the UN. The UN was considered the one responsible for 13 years of sanctions. The UN was supporting the USA in its actions. The dastardly attack on the UN in Iraq could be as a result of these perceptions.

There are new as well as old threats. The "hard" threats can be categorised as terrorism, weapons of mass destruction (WMD) etc. "Soft" threats are poverty, deprivation in society, spread of infectious diseases, and environmental degradation. These are also threats to society and need to be addressed seriously. The USA may consider WMD and terrorism as serious threats. Somalia may have different threats. For them Acquired Immune Disease Syndrome (AIDS) and poverty would be the more serious threats.

In the past this whole question has been dealt with based on collective security of the UN Charter. Even for self defence, the legitimacy of the UN has been sought because the provisions of the UN Charter allow for this. This whole aspect has been brought into question by the events of the year 2003. It is a challenge to the principles

on which the world peace and stability have rested for 58 years.

It is not enough to denounce unilateralism. We must recognise that obviously the USA took action because they felt the need and there were some concerns. One has to recognise the root of that and see whether there is any method by which that can be addressed through collective action. This is going to be one of the main jobs of the panel.

We have, therefore, come to the fork in the road. Secretary General has called this moment as decisive as when the UN was founded in 1945. This is how seriously they look at it. So, the need to decide whether we can continue on the basis that was agreed upon in 1945 or whether there is a need to introduce radical changes and, therefore, the need to review instruments at our disposal.

The composition of the Security Council needs to conform to geopolitical realities. There is need to strengthen the General Assembly, which is seen by many as purely a forum for debating today. Then there is the role of economic and social council and the UN as a whole –whether there is a need to do something for it to be reinvigorated.

16 Member High Level Panel Constituted by the Secretary General

To address all these issues, a 16-member panel has been formed. Their task is to:-

- (a) Examine current challenges to peace and security.
- (b) Consider the contribution collective action can make in addressing these challenges.

(c) Review functioning of major organs of the UN and relationship between them.

(d) Recommend ways of strengthening the UN through reform of its institutions and processes.

It needs to be noted that the focus is primarily on threats to peace and security.

The aim is to recommend clear and practical measures for ensuring effective collective action, based on rigorous analysis of future threats to peace and security, an appraisal of the contribution collective action can make, and a thorough assessment of existing approaches, instruments and mechanisms, including the principal organs of the UN.

The panel has not been asked to formulate policies on specific issues, nor on the UN's role in specific places. It is asked to provide a new assessment of the challenges ahead, and recommend changes that will be required if these challenges are to be met effectively through collective action. Specifically, the panel will:-

(a) Examine today's global threats and provide analysis of future challenges to international peace and security. Reconcile variations in perceptions to find an appropriate balance and establish connections between different threats.

(b) Identify clearly the contribution that collective action can make in addressing these challenges.

(c) Recommend changes necessary to ensure effective collective action,

including but not limited to review of principal organs of the UN.

The Panel's work is to be confined to the field of peace and security, broadly interpreted. That is, it should extend its analysis and recommendations to other issues and institutions, including economic and social, to the extent that they have a direct bearing on future threats to peace and security. It is basically dealing with the aspects of threats and challenges.

In the first meeting of the Panel some of these were dealt with. There are wars between states, wars within states including genocide, state failure or collapse because there is a lot of talk about intervention, international community intervening in state collapse, international terrorism, proliferation of conventional and weapons of mass destruction, civilisational conflict, religious and racial intolerance and radicalism, internationally organised crime including trafficking in drugs and human beings, violation of human rights, migration, environmental degradation, poverty and so on. One can see the range of threats that one is talking about. There are differences in terms of the categorisation and priority accorded to these problems and the relationship between them. Therefore, when the Panel makes its recommendations, the international community will need to address and look for a balanced approach that would recognise all these. Validation of different perceptions may well be a prerequisite for consensus if progress has to be made regarding changes. The linkages between these threats have to be recognised and these need further clarification.

THIRD SESSION : THIRD PAPER**DR C RAJA MOHAN**

I will try to bring different perspective, which is not based on the experience in the United Nations (UN) as the Chairman General Nambiar and our Chinese friends have. As a realist and students of the international affairs I have different answers to the debate on the bleak future of the UN. There is not much of a future for the UN as we get closer to the 60th anniversary. I need to add a caveat. I am not saying we do not need the whole range of UN agencies like World Health Organisation (WHO), World Meteorological Organisation (WMO), the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) and so on. We need a whole range of UN agencies essentially to coordinate activities between nations and states on matters which are fundamentally transnational which required cooperation between states or to make things easier for all of us.

Where I believe the UN has no role, or less or declining role are two core aspects of the international society. One is the economic activity and the other is the security activity. On either of these, I do not think that the UN ever had much to do. If it had gone by the kind of resolutions the UN had passed in the 1970, on the international economic order, we would have been under the socialism and fortunately that prospect has not materialised because the world and economy has moved in a different direction.

But what I focus today is really on the failure on the security front. That the expectations of the UN to play a central role on the security was never met and unlikely to be met in the coming days. In the core business of security on the questions of war and peace, the UN role at best would be

secondary. Either in legitimising function post facto as in Iraq or acting as a clean up crew essentially to sort out problems when the great powers mess it up, you need some collective clean up from the international system to go in and sort out the mess to the extent that it can be done. Beyond that I see a very little prospect for the UN in the security area.

I have nine points to elaborate. First point is that, there is serious structural crisis in the UN security system today. If you want evidence you just have to look at what happened in the last few months. The war in Iraq to oust Saddam Hussain took place without the consent of the UN is itself not an important fact, but it took place after going to the UN. After the number one power in the international system takes initiative in the UN and fails to convince the majority opinion in the Security Council and then they decide what they have to do. In spite of the lack of endorsement from the UN, the US went to war. This indicates something about the structure of power in the international system today. That the entire UN system, all the other four permanent members and the non-permanent members of the Security Council can not prevent the sole super power from doing what it wants to do. If it felt strongly about an issue there is no power today in the international system put together that can not stop the USA from doing what it wants to do. I think that is a cold reality and that is the reality we saw unfold before us during the recent crisis in relation to Iraq.

The second question is about the credibility of the UN Security Council. One is that no weapons of mass destruction (WMD)

or evidence was found. This is largely been seen as a triumph of those who argued against the US intervention.

In spite of the process of inspections, the UN could not get itself to make the case that enough is enough and you can not punish the Iraqi people for too long and that the sanctions must be lifted. But there is no majority and certainly, not any collective view in the UN Security Council that such a course was a right course when we go back to the debate between the US and its opponents on the run up to this war. The arguments of those who did not want a war was let us do inspection for another 10 years. Let's do more and get more army of inspectors, bring in every person knowledgeable on WMD in the world to Iraq. Let's dig under every bush of Iraq to find out if one gram of plutonium can be found somewhere.

An alternative to war at this stage was no brilliant alternative either, in that it was essentially about saying do more of the same stuff what you did in the 1990s. The debate by no means is satisfactory, as one is saying, "there is WMD, I am going to war", the other says "hang on, I will inspect for 10 more years, give me a chance, we will do it again". But in the end, there is nothing to look for.

The third issue is the deepening divergence of opinion within the five permanent members of the Security Council. The debate and differences over Iraqi disarmament were not just about technical issues. Whether there was the evidences or not, I think it reflected a more fundamental difference between those who believed that United States and Britain that there are forces out there which are threat to peace of security which must be changed and those regimes must be overthrown. That is the political point

essentially made by the US and that the other side was unwilling to accept the formulation in any fundamental matter. Beneath this divergence is a more deeper division between the great powers on what are the natures of the threats to the international system today?

The fourth question is collective security. Collective security though in the UN charter is loosely used. My assessment is that the UN is not about collective security. The League of Nations was about collective security. It believed one for all and all for one and for one and one will stand for peace. Any violation would not be accepted.

What Second World War taught us was collective security does not work. That states do not share threat perception and the rise of Fascism in Europe was seen differently by different set of actors. A large part of them were ready to appease Fascism rather than fight it until it became absolutely necessary. The UN system was a reaction against the notions of collective security that under by the League of Nations. The UN system is not a collective security but a concert system that believes five great powers who came out of the war will get together in concert. That is the meaning of the Veto power. The concept of P5 would underwrite the security of the international system. The five major powers would provide the security of the international system. The system did not take off very well because China was not a member of the international system then and as Taiwan for a long time kept on saying that they were the real China.

The second reason for collective security not working was that the allies in the Second World War became adversaries. The US and Soviet Union became adversaries and there was no way of structuring this

concept of great powers once the Cold War set in. Given the structure of the powers today collective security has very little chance and I do not see it working in the present times as to restrain the dominant power is limited.

The fifth point is about India and China in the UN Security Council. Diplomatic rhetoric is deceptive. Both India-China, for example, strongly support multilateralism for the UN. Both want UN to be more active. But at the core, there is a significant difference between India and China. China is a permanent member of the Security Council, therefore, it is perfectly logical for the Chinese to make the case that the UN must be strengthened and stronger under and the rules of the UN must be maintained because China is a part of the body that makes those rules. India is not. However, much of past rhetoric might tell of a belief in the UN and India's interest in getting into the gang that decide things or change the rules. It is fairly self-evident and purely as a power argument there is no complexities about that. But I do not think when the Indian and Chinese meet there is this kind of bonhomie. Both of us support the UN role, but in the core there is a fundamental difference. China can be satisfied with the present arrangements. India is a revisionist power and it needs modification of the existing international system, certainly in the security order. Either it has to be accommodated, if it can not be accommodated, I do not see why India has any stake in maintaining an order in which it has no say. So the logical Indian interest would be that they get on board or replace the existing system with a new certain rules, in which it can then play a larger role.

The sixth aspect is that, while both India and China while rhetorically talk about the UN, they have a very deep ambiguity about the UN. China is better placed to deal with this complexity than we are because they

are the members of the Security Council. While India and China talk about strengthening the UN multilateral system etc. one thing is very clear that both of them believe in "you be strong elsewhere, I won't let you in my house". India has a very strong support to the UN but lot of time we do not even give visa to Kofi Annan, because we think that he is going to talk about Kashmir. India is absolutely against the UN intervention where it concerns its own disputes like the Kashmir question. The Foreign office praises the UN and in the next breath will tell you that the UN has no business to talk about Kashmir.

The seventh point is that India and China have an opposition to the UN Security Council's role in the region. We do not want the UN to come in into our disputes where our territorial integrity is concerned, but also in Nepal. The argument is that we have a security treaty with Nepal and we will decide what goes on there, we are not going to let a bunch of UN bureaucrats come and muck around in Nepal which is in my backyard.

Similarly, I am sure the Chinese are not going to let the UN anywhere near Taiwan if there is military tension between China and Taiwan. I am not sure that UN is going to be very enthusiastic about the UN role to solve the problem. That is going to be essentially a triangular arrangement between US, China and Taiwan.

This brings me to the last two points. One is the new challenges to India's UN policy. If we are looking to it objectively, and it in terms of power, clearly the old slogans are not going to work. We have to come to terms with the fact that the existing structures of the UN in relation to security are dilapidated and are unlikely to survive. But this is not to say that the UN is going to be abolished. But

structures beyond it, supplementing it and complementing it essentially in areas relating to war and peace will see other arrangements and alliances between the dominant powers. Those would increasingly play a larger role in different parts of the world, in terms of thinking about security issues and how to manage peace. While there may be hundreds of peace keeping operations going on, but on the core issues of war and peace in the international system are not going to be allowed to go to the UN.

India is caught in a trap. On the one hand it hopes for a reform in which it would get into the boardroom. On the other hand, if that does not happen, because of sufficient number of people that are going to prevent it. It is not very clear whether Italy wants Germany in, China wants Japan in, Pakistan wants India in and so on. The prospect of

reform which will accommodate India's interest looks difficult. I do not see it happening in the near future. If that does not happen in the case for India, then what would be the alternatives and what kind of structures can be developed, where India can play a larger role?

In conclusion, I think the challenges is really not to look at the world posturing of the past but to look at the ways in which these new structures can be created because multilateralism in UN need not be absolutely synonymous when it comes to war and peace as our experience tells us. There is life beyond UN, there is life beneath and on the sideways whichever way you want to look at it. The security order is going to be maintained by a coalition of great powers. Which will those be and whether in that new coalition India has a place or not is a real challenge to us.

DISCUSSANTS

Air Marshal Vir Narain, PVSM (Retd)

We have heard some very thoughtful and incisive presentations on the future of the United Nations (UN). Mr. Zheng's presentation was very comprehensive and covered conventional and non-conventional threats, dangers of unilateralism, dangers of economic globalisation and of course, he covered the question of the reforms of the UN. General Nambiar has also covered partly a historical overview of the UN, and brought out what is likely to happen after the Iraq war. Of course, I must join Ambassador Gharekhan in expressing our great pride and satisfaction that General Nambiar is a part of the 16 member team which is going to look into the vital international issues for the Secretary General.

Dr Raja Mohan gave us an India-specific view of the future of the UN spelling out where our stakes and interests lie. It is true that there has to be a restructuring of the UN. But it would be instructive to look back, when we are considering the future of the UN, on the fate of the League of Nations and what happened after Ethiopia was attacked by Italy. There are certain historical resonances, which may or may not come true again. The present crisis in Iraq is not due particularly to any great deficiency in the UN system. Basically it is due to the fact that the strongest member of the UN - the USA - has chosen to ignore the UN Charter and to defy international law.

It is bad enough that the UN was born as an oligarchic organisation. But superpower rivalry enforced a certain balance - even if that balance was full of tension. Now that oligarchy has been replaced by a monopoly of power by the USA, it is here that the roots

of the present crisis lie. The central issue, therefore, is the doctrine of unilateral action. The central issue is not the UN, because if its strongest member decides to defy the UN, there is not very much that it can do. General Nambiar said that, while the unilateral action cannot be condoned, it was now a matter of history. We cannot dismiss it so lightly. We have to do something to ensure that this is not repeated. This cannot be done by tinkering with the UN organisation. What happened in Iraq was really a vigilante action outside of international law. Clearly the responsibility and the remedy for the present situation lies with the super power. I am afraid that no amount of tinkering with the UN organisation is going to yield any results. But can the USA be persuaded to abandon its unilateralist doctrine? Perhaps; but only if their experience in Iraq makes them rethink. It is still not very clear as to whether it will reinforce their doctrine of unilateral action or whether they will say "we have burnt our fingers and never again". They have learnt a lesson before in Vietnam, but as a generation passes, lessons are forgotten. We go back to human nature. It has been said that men enjoy war as they enjoy gluttony, gambling and crime.

Coming to the high-level panel that General Nambiar spoke about - it was disappointing to see the note at the end of their listed tasks, that the focus will primarily be on future threats. The focus needs equally to be on the ability of the UN in the future to deal with any threats that might arise. Are we going to be equipped and in a position to handle those threats? So, perhaps the rider was not really necessary. The focus must also be equally on the ability of the UN to cope with these threats.

As far as India and China's approach to the UN is concerned, it is obvious that we want a seat in the Security Council, which we do not have, and the Chinese already have a seat. So our situation is very different. But that does not erode or vitiate our commitment to the UN, or our desire to see that the UN is strengthened even as it is, whether or not we are in the Security Council. It is in India's interest to see that the UN is strengthened, the UN Charter is observed, international law is respected and, above all, the interventionist doctrines that seem to be gaining ground are firmly repudiated by the UN and the international community. In other words, the role of sovereignty cannot be diluted. The Westphalian system is with us, and it must not be tampered with so that any nation's sovereignty is violated. To the extent to which states get together, either in the European Union or elsewhere in regional agreements, compacts and the treaties, they naturally - and voluntarily - share some of their sovereignty with other sovereign states.

Mr. Zheng pointed out quite rightly that the UN first must have a democratic set up, while it is today a kind of oligarchy of five powers. There is no question that the intervention in other countries' sovereignty can often be undertaken to serve the vested interests of the big powers. So, we are with the UN and we wish that it remains strong and that, in due course, India and some other powers may find place on the Security Council. Like us, I am sure, China also gets its share of these itinerant US scholars who come and talk to us about various subjects. I remember one of them who spoke to us about Indo-US relations. I put to him that one litmus test of the Indo-US relations would be if the United States sponsored, or at least agreed to, a seat for India on the Security Council. His reply was: "what is in it for us?"

Why should we give it to you?" In other words, it is treated as a kind of trade off and not something to be decided on its merits. I did not remind him of the fact that India sponsored the case of China's seat on the UN and the Security Council, not because we expected anything out of it but because it was obvious that a great nation like China had to have a place in the UN. But at the moment that is the attitude of the sole superpower.

Ambassador Li Daoyu

If you look at the history of the UN, it was founded after the World War II. Its Charter was drafted before the war ended based on the lessons from the two World Wars. The predominant aspect of the Charter is as to how humanity can avoid the scourge of wars. Also the Charter was based on international norms and laws following victory over fascism. So that is why concern on human rights violation is reflected in the Charter. After its formation, the UN had to deal with a number of challenges not visualised earlier. The first was the period of decolonisation. This was not envisaged in the Charter. I agree with General Nambiar said about the charter being flexible enough to cover decolonisation because it respects the equality of all states. In the 1970s, stress in most countries was on development. We all know about the 6th Special Session of the General Assembly focusing on New International Economic Order in the wake of the oil crisis. Further during the last 50 years or so the regional conflicts occupied the main agenda of the UN and the Security Council. If we assess the successes and failures of the Security Council and the history of its involvement in regional conflicts, there are successes as well as failures. I can take the examples of Cambodia and East Timor, as

success stories. These were achieved slowly through diplomatic means. I cannot miss the success of the UN Peacekeeping Operations (PKO) in which General Nambiar was a very prominent person who successfully carried out his task in Yugoslavia. PKO is a special development of the collective security concept as given in the Charter. It is not meant to be an armed intervention.

When we look at armed intervention by the UN, the record can hardly be considered good or successful. Some one may cite Korea. That was actually a conflict between the East and the West. The UN was on the western side and China was on the opposite side. So, we do not recognise that it was a legitimate UN intervention in Korea. India was the Chairman of the neutral supervision committee under the armistice agreement. What that means is that on one side there was the UN and on the other was China and North Korea and India was a neutral member.

Let us look at some other cases of the use of force by the UN. The first one was in the Balkans. Ambassador Gharekhan and I witnessed that. That operation was authorised by the Security Council yet implemented by coalition forces. Thus the authorisation was for the member states to use force if they deemed it necessary. Secretary General Perez de Cuellar insisted that it was not a UN war. He repeatedly declared that, much to the displeasure of the superpower – the USA. The last time when he visited Washington and when asked about the Gulf War he said, "it is not a war authorised by the UN. It was by the coalition forces." He further added, "if it were for the UN, Iraq could not have been bombed so badly and so inhumanly." This statement cost him his job. President Bush spoke during the General Assembly and spoke of farewell to the

Secretary General. Actually at that juncture, the question of Perez de Cuellar seeking another term as the Secretary General was in the air. But speech of the President of the USA was in fact a very polite way of a farewell.

Then we come to the war in Kosovo. The NATO by passed the UN intentionally and there was no debate in the Security Council. Yet, when they wanted to clean up the mess, they attempted to seek the authority of the UN and the clout of the UN to get money.

Then we come to the Gulf War II. Prime Minister Tony Blair of the UK insisted that the USA should go through the Security Council. The neo-conservatives in the USA wanted to go ahead without raising the matter at the UN. That was a failure. I agree with the analysis of Dr C Raja Mohan and General Nambiar.

It is very clear that the UN has become a tool of the USA's foreign policy. This reminds me of a recent speech by Bill Clinton when he talked about his differences with the present US administrative on unilateralism. He said, "my government turned to unilateralism when multilateralism was not feasible." The Bush administration turned to multilateralism when unilateralism was not feasible. It meant that unilateralism is not feasible in the post war in Iraq and they have to go back to the UN Security Council. But first they need Security Council's authority. The criticism of this action, by the US, by other members of the UN is well known.

Yesterday I had explained as to what I thought about why China, Russia and other members went along. This exercise has proved that in the final analysis, multilateralism will prevail over unilateralism. The scenario

is not yet complete and there are weaknesses that need to be overcome.

Is there scope for serious reforms of the UN? Take the enlargement of the Security Council. Would a larger Security Council be better? I am not sure about this as yet. This estimation holds good till the forthcoming elections in the USA. We do not know what the next US administration would think about their foreign policy and policy regarding the UN.

I agree with General Nambiar's observation that the UN is at cross roads. It can be compared to the times when the UN was founded. We have a lot of new issues and challenges to deal with. We want to make the UN even more relevant to the present times. We have a list of the issues. Peace and security continues to be the main theme. We have numerous threats to the peace and security. We have traditional and non traditional threats.

Besides a Security Council, people have suggested a Development Council also. In keeping with the trend of globalisation, the UN should assume a leading role with more emphasis on development. This is, of course, ideal and very much in the interest of developing countries.

In the traditional and non traditional security threats we have terrorism, crimes, environment, communicable diseases and so on. All these threats need to be defined. How to define them is a big question, because there are different views about these threats. A lot of time of the high level panel would be devoted to get a consensus on what kind of a threat the UN is facing and what are the major challenges?

The third point is preventive measures. Because preventive measures may involve pre-emption through military means of the type undertaken by the Bush administration. Their rationale is that terrorists cannot be deterred, they can only be pre-empted. The question that needs to be addressed is whether the UN should take the responsibility for taking pre-emptive measures? This issue is complicated because of need for reliable intelligence. There would be conflicting inputs in most conflict scenarios. What would be the targets and how to tackle the question of sovereignty? So these are very difficult questions to answer. My personal view is that on this question people need to be very discrete.

The fourth point is about organisational reforms. That is the end product. Major organs of the UN are already being reviewed as mentioned by General Nambiar. The Security Council, could be at the core of reforms. The next important issue is whether the Security Council needs to be enlarged. How big it should be and how many additional non-permanent and permanent seats need to be there? Also the voting procedure needs to be worked out, because in the UN Security Council voting procedure is well defined. Further who should take the new seats?

In looking at the structure of the UN, the imbalance is due to lack of representation of developing countries. At the time of the foundation of the UN there were only 50 members. Now there are more than 190. The new members are mostly from the developing countries. The underdeveloped countries have less representation, although they form the bulk of the membership of the UN. We hope to see more representation from important and prominent developing countries.

Indian scholars have mentioned that the UN should accommodate the new and rising India. I think this kind of thinking is very logical. The dream of the Chinese people is to be treated properly by the international community. So we understand India's expectations. What ever I mention has no bearing on the government. But we have no difficulty and would welcome the enlargement of the Security Council with more representation of important developing countries. China is a member of the Security Council yet we are not content with that kind of a status quo of the UN. We loose nothing if the UN is strengthened or if the Security Council is enlarged. We would have more voices of the developing countries. I am afraid, the superpower may be difficult on this issue and we have to persuade it. I think China in

this process would hold consultations with all major countries in all regions. Of course, we would consult India just like the way. I used to consult Ambassador CR Gharekhan in the past. Specific Chinese position on this issue would be firmed up after a process of consultations with major powers of all regions. I would expect it to be like this, although I am not in the Government now.

Chairman's Remarks

Thank you very much Ambassador Li Daoyu. I can assure you that all the Indian participants listened to you most carefully, especially the concluding portion of your presentation. Thank you for your personal insights into various issues on peace and security.

GENERAL DISCUSSION

Major General YK Gera (Retd)

I am grateful to Ambassador Li Daoyu for making those comments and observations towards the end. Based on his comments I want to flag a couple of issues. He made a very interesting statement that the UN has been used as a tool of the US foreign policy – which is a fact. In its support he quoted a number of examples that are absolutely true. But what is really important is that since a re-look is being taken at the UN, what we need to highlight is what steps need to be taken to ensure that such a thing does not reoccur or it is minimised, and the USA agrees to do something about it because nobody does these things voluntarily. Since the decisions taken are binding and we have the five permanent members and China is one of them. What can they do within the existing framework to overcome this weakness and build more safeguards into the system?

The second issue which I want to flag is pertaining to the criteria for nations to become permanent members in case the organisation is restructured or expanded. Is there a qualitative requirement or a basic norm for countries to qualify to become permanent members.

The third issue is the voting pattern. At the moment, the voting is not so simple. It is quite a complicated affair. Obviously it must have evolved over a period of time to meet certain contingencies and requirements. Can it be simplified?

Finally, based on all the weaknesses that have been highlighted during the presentations and by the discussants, I am not sure whether the UN is likely to go the way the League of Nations or is there any light towards the end of the tunnel?

Air Vice Marshal Viney Kapila, AVSM, VrC (Retd)

I agree with the discussants that today's dilemma has been caused by the actions of the USA. This is the USA's major venture into unilateralism and pre-emption. We have agreed that it is wrong as per international laws and relations. If this is allowed to succeed then history would judge our behaviour in the same fashion as when Hitler went about his conquests without opposition. While I agree with all the other actions that have been taken to reform the UN as a necessity, what we need to do at this time is to contain or at least get America to learn a lesson. The best choice is to let it remain embroiled there till finally it realises that it has bloodied its nose and decides to pull out from such misadventures for at least the coming decade. It is possible to go about it surreptitiously or directly? It should be a common aim of other nations to let the USA learn a proper lesson.

Major General Dipankar Banerjee, AVSM (Retd)

The UN with all its faults and limitations is the only global organisation that we have. I do not agree with Dr C Raja Mohan that if countries do not find satisfaction from the UN, then why not move towards creating something different. This option may look attractive but is not feasible. We need to reform the UN. The Secretary General has shown a remarkable ability to address this issue through the best possible means such as the convening of the high level panel and several other initiatives. The Brahimi Committee report on UN Peacekeeping Operations is one such example. This report

has addressed the shortcoming in the existing peacekeeping mechanism. These are being rectified. The question really is that any meaningful changes to the Security Council to make it more effective and responsive will have to be via reconstitution. You cannot have one country dictating as to what the UN will do or not do. Last year I was in the USA spending some time at the universities on the east coast and I found a common perception there that the UN is just a tool or handmaiden of the USA. There is a great frustration in the USA to the opposition in the UN system in not toeing the US line. We thus have to look at reconstituting the Security Council in areas such as its powers and functioning. I know that restructuring would face enormous opposition. Nobody in the existing power structure would be willing to give up what they have. This is a fundamental challenge. The unilateral power structure needs to be changed.

Mr Ye Ru'an

Having heard the previous speakers, I find a lot of commonality in their views. I just want to make a very short comment. I totally agree with Air Marshal Vir Narain and General Nambiar that the central issue or fundamental challenge confronting the USA is not unsatisfactory structures or deficiencies in the management of operations of the UN. It is on account of the monopoly of power by the USA. It ignores the role of the UN and wants to pursue its own interests. I think the most serious single and fundamental challenge to the UN is this.

The behaviour of the US is a process that evolved during the post Cold War period. The first National Security Strategy released by the Bush Sr administration after the Gulf War I, in which he proposed a new political

world order which contained something more than what met the eye. Perhaps in his mind, this world order is to be under the leadership of the USA and not the UN. This aspect has been followed by his son — the present incumbent. The policy makers in the USA went further. Take the critical issue of sovereignty. In 1968, the Soviet Union under Brezhnev, as a policy of limited sovereignty, invaded and occupied Czechoslovakia. Now the US has developed a theory on the issue of sovereignty. I can recall a recent speech by Mr Richard Hass a former Director of Policy planning at the US State Department. He mentioned that there is no absolute national sovereignty. He elaborated that countries such as 'failed states', 'rogue states' or any state with irresponsible leadership and nations possessing weapons of mass destruction, — their sovereignty can be denied not by the UN, but the USA. If this kind of theory is permitted in practice, one can imagine what the UN can do to ensure national sovereignty of all its members.

Brigadier Gurmeet Kanwal (Retd)

There is a distinct lack of commitment by the P5 in peacekeeping. For example, the USA has made it clear that their troops will fight only under the US flag and not even under the UN flag. My question is addressed to Ambassador Li Daoyu. Could you please let us know the reason why China also chose not to contribute troops to the UN peacekeeping operations for over half a century?

Lieutenant General Satish Nambiar, PVSM, AVSM, VrC (Retd)

This is in relation to Dr Raja Mohan's presentation. His point about collective security was well made and well taken. But when the Secretary General has talked in

terms of the role of this panel he is basically looking at collective action. We need to distinguish between "collective security" and "collective action." The Secretary General is talking of the responses to the global threats and challenges by "collective actions." This aspect needs some more clarification.

Air Marshal Vir Narain had made a point regarding the focus being on the ability of the UN to cope with threats. That is not quite true. The panel has been asked specifically to "examine today's global threats and provide analyses of future challenges to international peace and security." It is required to identify clearly "the contribution collective action can make in addressing these challenges and recommend changes necessary." All that is a part of it as — threat, challenges and changes.

As regards General Gera's question on the qualification to become a member of the Security Council, these are the issues which do not have answers and need deliberations. The panel would certainly try to address them. There would be a number of views and deliberations would be needed.

Regarding Air Marshal Viney Kapila's question, we have got to recognise, though we may not like the reality at all that the US is running the world today and is the sole super eminent power. I do not agree with him that the Americans are going to get embroiled in Iraq and suffer the same fate as the Soviet Union did in Afghanistan. This is not a good thing for the world. If the Americans fail in Iraq, in my view, the rest of us would also face the spill-over consequences of the terrorists. The terrorists would be perceived as having won against the superpower and, therefore, the rest of the world might be easy meat. That is the

danger as far as we are concerned. I am not too sure that we should wish the Americans getting embroiled. Why I say this is because in addressing the aspect of change that is necessary to the international system ; it is the USA who is flouting it the most. The USA must be having good reasons for it. It can not be just due to some neo-conservatives. They must be doing it because they feel that their national interests cannot be pursued within the existing system. If you do not address that concern, then I am afraid you would come against a wall. As thing stand today, we can not get anywhere, because as I have said, you may wish that the Americans may go downhill, but that is going to take a very long time — longer than our lifetimes.

Even during the Non Alignment Movement (NAM), countries were bought by the USA. Any country who dared and opposed them in the General Assembly or in other places had their aid is cut off the next day. It is as bad as that. I recall a recent article regarding Yemen opposing the USA in a case in the General Assembly and the American delegate's whisper was overheard in the mike as "you guys had it — tomorrow your aid would be withdrawn". This is how it is, though I accept that we do not like it. But we need to find answers to it. This is the real challenge which the panel would face.

Ambassador Li Daoyu

In answer to the question on what can we do when the USA does whatever it wants with the UN. I think, given that the USA is the sole superpower, nobody can stop them. The only factor that can stop them is their own failures and setbacks. This can be seen in Iraq. The scenario in Iraq has incited a debate within the academic and political circles in the USA. You should make a note of the

arguments of the Democrats during electioneering. When the USA decides to go through the UN as a tool of foreign policy, I think we should accept it because it would have to compromise as it needs votes of member states. Even during the Gulf War I, this worked and amendment to the draft were made. This is actually a political reality.

Regarding the guidelines and norms, there should be guidelines and norms for choosing permanent members of the Security Council. That would be the job of the high level panel which would decide on the guidelines. "Peace-loving" can be a qualification. But even "peace-loving" can some times be controversial as to who is peace-loving and who is not? Of course, some states are non-controversial, especially those with a historic burden from the Second World War.

Why has China not sent troops for UN peacekeeping? My personal observation is that China is very careful in this regard. As I see it, we never had that kind of experience before, unlike India. In China they say that the first man to eat a crab must be very brave. So we have not eaten the crab. We have experience of fighting the American troops under the UN. This experience made the Chinese people not very sympathetic with the UN in the past. But now this has changed. In the 1980s, the process of China's participation in the UN peacekeeping operations commenced with small steps. Some observers and engineer companies were sent to Cambodia. We have military observers in Iraq, Syria and West Sahara. We sent police to East Timor. We are now moving forward, but are careful and do not wish to get bogged down in a quagmire. We want to learn from India's experience in this regard.

Air Marshal Vir Narain, PVSM (Retd)

I think Air Marshal Viney Kapila's point was not that we should actively undermine the American efforts in Iraq. But the reality is that if you do something and you get a good reward for it, you will be motivated again to do it. Whereas if there are negative feed backs, then the tendency to indulge in that sort of behaviour would reduce. In this case it is very difficult to spell out as to what constitutes a success in Iraq. Also what would constitute an utter failure. But there are degrees of success like no gain – no loss and so on. The important thing here is that the outside world cannot change the behaviour of the USA. The change has to come from within. Therefore, it is important that the American public feels that it has not come away with flying colours from Iraq. Whereupon, perhaps, there will be a change in administration and philosophy of unilateralism. Even within the USA, some people are opposed to the doctrine of unilateralism as unethical and politically unwise. These forces may not strengthened and succeed in bringing about a change in thrust of the US foreign policy.

Alternatively, if the operations in Iraq are seen by American public as successful, the administration may continue and proceed with its unilateral policy. This situation may not be good for us. So I think it is quite legitimate for us to wish that the experience in Iraq should be sufficiently chastening for the Americans, so that they do not think of doing such a thing again. Otherwise countries like Syria, Iran and so on may be next. Let us not be starry eyed about establishing democracy in the Middle East. It is a totally Quixotic notion as it is unlikely that democracy can take firm roots in the region.

As regards the security concerns of the USA, let us look at their point of view. They must have had some genuine security concern and let us find that out. Similarly, what were the security concerns of Iraq when it invaded Kuwait in 1990? That also needs to be examined. Sheer national self-interest overriding ethical principles, and international law and the UN has also happened. We do not have to find reasons as to why they did it and try to alleviate their problems. The reason to invade could well be for oil and money instead of some perceived threat and trumped up charges of the WMD.

Mr Zheng Ruixiang

All problems confronted by the UN are caused by the unilateralism of the USA. Although the USA wants to pursue of policy of might is right, but I do not think the USA is almighty. It is very powerful but not almighty. There is still room for joint efforts of the international community to do something.

The second point pertains to Dr C Raja Mohan's paper. I told him that he is too pessimistic about the UN and the international situation. My personal views are that the answer lies in following a "middle path" which is neither pessimistic nor optimistic.

Chairman's Remarks

It seems to me that we have been too harsh on the US. This criticism is somewhat hypocritical. The USA is a preeminent power in the world today. Any country in that position would want to retain that position. In India, I see that we are being too self-righteous about things. We ourselves are not angels. We did not even go to the UN when we had to intervene in East Pakistan (now Bangladesh)

in 1971, when that country was born. We did not even try to get a UN mandate for the 1971 war. Of course the General Assembly voted resoundingly against India – we should not forget that. That did not diminish India's commitment to the UN. India remained loyal to the UN. There are many examples of unilateral actions. There was the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, about which the UN made a lot of fuss – it was a unilateral action. Similarly, Tanzania had taken action against Uganda. So these things go on all the time. Similarly, the UK went to war over the Falkland Islands and the Security Council did not give it a mandate for that.

If India was a strong country, it would have used the UN to promote its own national interests. Everyone at the UN behaves in a manner where its own national interests are not affected. When mini-skirts were first introduced in 1960s, the question was that is mini-skirt a good idea? All would say that they liked mini-skirts but not when "my daughter wears it". Similarly, if we are unhappy with the US (which we are) and I am also very unhappy about the US then the rest of the countries have to do something about it. Mr Boutros-Boutros Ghali who was known to both of us Ambassador Li Daoyu and myself as we were on his staff, used to say that "what is the point of blaming the Americans? Why do not the rest of you – the middle powers – get together and check the role of the US"? So there is no point in blaming, but one must try to do something about it.

We must understand that national interests drive the policies of member states of the UN. The UN is not an ideal organisation. It is a political body. It is not a judicial body or a court of law where justice

can be sought. It is ridiculous that India went to the UN Security Council in 1949 over Jammu and Kashmir – it was the most stupid thing to have been done.

We were too idealistic and as we now say, we were young, immature and inexperienced. But the UN is not about ideology or ideas. It is about power politics. Where nations play games to protect and further their interests, we have to take a hard approach towards the UN and not an idealistic one. Because an idealistic approach is not going to work and it would harm us. So unilateralism is not going to remain an American monopoly.

But what the UN has done over the past 60 odd years is that because of the institution of the UN, wars can be justified only under two circumstances as under:-

- (a) If it is authorised by the UN Security Council.
- (b) If it is in the exercise of the right of self defence.

Under the right of self defence, all kinds of things can be done because there is nothing to define the right of self defence. It is for each country to judge for itself whether circumstances justify to exercise the right of self defence.

Even when the USA went to war in Iraq in March 2003 it did not say that they are taking a unilateral action. They said that they are going to war to implement the UN Security Council Resolutions over WMD and other things. Whether they were justified in doing that is another matter. In my view they were not justified. But they also tried to justify their actions in terms of the UN Security Council Resolution. It is very well established today

that only a UN Security Council Resolution authorisation or the right of self defence can justify a military intervention by a state in another member state.

What are the criteria and grounds for humanitarian intervention? The trouble is that some member states try to evolve a criteria or principles for certain action. General Nambar has wisely noted that the charter is a flexible document. It may or may not be good to have flexibility. Like any written document, it is open to interpretation. The UN charter is no exception to this rule. That is how peace keeping operations were developed, because the charter did not mention that we cannot have peace keeping operations. In the same way there is no provision for humanitarian intervention in the Charter. But in the past the UN has intervened on humanitarian grounds. Somalia is a live example. The rest of the world could not have cared less. A detached attitude could not have been taken as mutual killings would have gone on. The UN could have said that “forget it – it is not our concern because the world peace and security is not threatened by what is going on in Somalia”. But we did not take that position. India then was in the Security Council and China is a permanent member of the Security Council. India is strongly attached to the principles of non-interference in internal affairs of states. But on Somalia, we agreed on intervention, because it was a blatant case of people killing people. We sent a brigade there. The same was the situation in East Timor. Regional peace was not threatened but the world thought that something had to be done about it. So if things are left to themselves, Security Council can deal with the situations.

But now when we say about a “principle of humanitarian intervention”, that is where

this problem comes up. What is the principle of humanitarian intervention? You try to codify it – that is a big mistake. In such a case it would be very difficult to establish a criteria. General Nambiar's panel will have to tackle this question and come out with some kind of "ground rules" for humanitarian intervention. But I think it is a recipe for disaster when you try and codify it.

This brings me to the 'Blue Ribbon' panel of the UN on which General Nambiar is a member. It is a very important initiative by the Secretary General. What national government does when there is a problem is to form a committee. Even at international level this is applicable, hence the panel. Hopefully, it would come up with some recommendations. It has a very important task to perform. But my concern is that in such bodies the Western powers gang up together. They always coordinate their moves. The USA, Canada, France, Germany etc will have frequent meetings amongst themselves to try and take a coordinated position on the panel. We the developing countries unfortunately do not do that. Perhaps we may not have the resources. In India we think that this is not a principled thing to do. I do hope that now India and China would consult one another. It is very important not only to coordinate positions, but certainly to try and take some kind of position which would ensure that the so called Western position does not prevail or is imposed. Prior consultation is crucial, certainly between China and India.

As Ambassador Li Daoyu has rightly said that the Gulf War I was not a UN's war. But it was a war fought in the name and flag of the UN. Why was it not fought by the UN? Because the UN does not have its own troops. So it authorises a group of member

states to do whatever they want to do. But it certainly was a war which the UN would have fought if it had the capability. But it did not as it did not have the capability. So it became a coalition war, but certainly on behalf of the UN. The Second Gulf War had nothing to do with the UN.

As regards Somalia, the Secretary General had suggested a number of options as to how peace keeping operations could be done. One option was a full fledged UN peace keeping operations. But the Secretary General Boutros-Boutros Ghali immediately added that the UN did not have the capability to mount large-scale operations. He said that we have no choice but to fall back on the business of coalition forces.

There is one thing which I need to mention about the P5 not contributing troops to the UN peace keeping operations. It is because during the Cold War there was a tradition for a long time that P5 should not take part in peace keeping operations. During the Cold War, the other members of the UN as a whole preferred to keep the P5 away. This was a tradition, nothing was in writing. Once the Cold War was over, P5 started to take part. They also insisted on involving more of the other countries. In the United Nations Iraq-Kuwait Observers Mission (UNIKOM) it was China which insisted on having more observers than the other non-permanent members.

Finally, let me end with a thought that we Indians must learn from China. I have seen and observed that Chinese diplomacy is very suave, effective, disciplined and focused. We Indians – I include myself in that category – are not that focused. We try to seek a bigger role for ourselves than what is warranted by our net capability, potential,

position and standing. We always try and see ourselves as leaders of this or that. This penchant for leadership is complete nonsense. I certainly try and learn from my Chinese friends as I did from Ambassador Li Daoyu in the UN. Indian diplomacy would do well if it observes Chinese diplomats at work at multilateral forums and learn from them.

Remarks by the Director USI

If I may add with the permission of the Chairman that the contribution for peace keeping is by military contingents. Even the Americans participate in many missions as observers. This has nothing to do with the American flag. After the Cold War, France and Russia also participated quite actively. The Americans have not. The Chinese have contributed in Cambodia with some engineer units and observers.

CLOSING REMARKS

LIEUTENANT GENERAL SATISH NAMBIAR, PVSM, AVSM, VrC (Retd)
DIRECTOR, USI

AMBASSADOR LI DAOYU
PRESIDENT, CACDA

CLOSING REMARKS

**LIEUTENANT GENERAL SATISH NAMBIAR, PVSM, AVSM, VrC (Retd)
DIRECTOR, USI OF INDIA**

We at the USI of India are grateful to Ambassador Li Daoyu and his colleagues from CACDA for having come over. It is a great honour and a privilege to have you with us over the last few days.

I must say that the discussions that we have had yesterday and today have covered a wide range of issues and have been most useful. It is extraordinary that how much we have been able to get out of it. Particularly satisfying is that it has revealed that there is so much convergence on many issues which India and China together with other members

of the international community face in the international arena today. I think both institutions must build on this by continuous dialogue and interaction in the future. I hope Ambassador Li Daoyu and his colleagues would lend full force to that suggestion. I would go further to suggest that we exchange papers and notes that we may produce in our respective institutions which we think are of value on a reciprocal basis.

We are looking forward to keeping in touch with you on a regular basis and see more of you, both in India and elsewhere.

CLOSING REMARKS

AMBASSADOR LI DAOYU, PRESIDENT, CACDA

I just want to express my profound appreciation and thanks to General Nambiar and the USI of India for their kind invitation which provided us such a very valuable opportunity to share our views. We also learnt from your views. For most of us, this is the first visit to New Delhi. I think this is a good starting point. Of course, the first visit to CACDA was by General Nambiar and his delegation. This one is the follow up. We hope that this sort of contact will be followed

up by many more visits in the future. We will keep contact and exchange material. As we are hosting seminars from time to time and because you cover a wide range of issues, so you must give us opportunities of benefiting further. I am sure you can spare time and come to China to attend a seminar on the UN reforms in April 2004. So that is good news. Our Association can be a humble host to you and your colleagues. Next time it would be your turn.